int32_t SSPPushRowRequestOpLogMgr::InformReply(int32_t table_id, int32_t row_id,
  int32_t clock, uint32_t curr_version, std::vector<int32_t> *app_thread_ids) {
  (*app_thread_ids).clear();
  std::pair<int32_t, int32_t> request_key(table_id, row_id);
  std::list<RowRequestInfo> &request_list = pending_row_requests_[request_key];
  int32_t clock_to_request = -1;

  while (!request_list.empty()) {
    RowRequestInfo &request = request_list.front();
    if (request.clock <= clock) {
      // remove the request
      app_thread_ids->push_back(request.app_thread_id);
      request_list.pop_front();
    } else {
      if (!request.sent) {
	clock_to_request = request.clock;
	request.sent = true;
      }
      break;
    }
  }
  // if there's no request in that list, I can remove the empty list
  if (request_list.empty())
    pending_row_requests_.erase(request_key);
  return clock_to_request;
}

char * _RequestPass(/*@[email protected]*/ const char * prompt)
{
/*@[email protected]*/ /*@[email protected]*/
    static char * password = NULL;
#if defined(HAVE_KEYUTILS_H)
    const char * foo = "user rpm:yyyy spoon";
    ARGV_t av = NULL;
    int xx = argvSplit(&av, foo, NULL);
    key_serial_t dest = 0;
    key_serial_t key = 0;

    if (password != NULL) {
	free(password);
	password = NULL;
    }
assert(av != NULL);
assert(av[0] != NULL);
assert(av[1] != NULL);
assert(av[2] != NULL);
    key = request_key(av[0], av[1], av[2], dest);
    av = argvFree(av);

/*@[email protected]*/	/* XXX *password may be null. */
    xx = keyctl_read_alloc(key, (void **)&password);
/*@[email protected]*/
    if (password == NULL)
	password = (char *) "";
#endif	/* HAVE_KEYUTILS_H */

/*@[email protected]*/
    return password;
/*@[email protected]*/
}

static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info,
			struct fscrypt_context *ctx, u8 *raw_key,
			u8 *prefix, int prefix_size)
{
	u8 *full_key_descriptor;
	struct key *keyring_key;
	struct fscrypt_key *master_key;
	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
	int full_key_len = prefix_size + (FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE * 2) + 1;
	int res;

	full_key_descriptor = kmalloc(full_key_len, GFP_NOFS);
	if (!full_key_descriptor)
		return -ENOMEM;

	memcpy(full_key_descriptor, prefix, prefix_size);
	sprintf(full_key_descriptor + prefix_size,
			"%*phN", FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
			ctx->master_key_descriptor);
	full_key_descriptor[full_key_len - 1] = '\0';
	keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, full_key_descriptor, NULL);
	kfree(full_key_descriptor);
	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key))
		return PTR_ERR(keyring_key);

	if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
		printk_once(KERN_WARNING
				"%s: key type must be logon\n", __func__);
		res = -ENOKEY;
		goto out;
	}
	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
	ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
	if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
		res = -EINVAL;
		up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
		goto out;
	}
	master_key = (struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
	BUILD_BUG_ON(FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);

	if (master_key->size != FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) {
		printk_once(KERN_WARNING
				"%s: key size incorrect: %d\n",
				__func__, master_key->size);
		res = -ENOKEY;
		up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
		goto out;
	}
	res = derive_key_aes(ctx->nonce, master_key->raw, raw_key);
	up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
	if (res)
		goto out;

	crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
	return 0;
out:
	key_put(keyring_key);
	return res;
}

int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
{
	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (!keyring[id]) {
		keyring[id] =
			request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
		if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
			int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
			pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
			keyring[id] = NULL;
			return err;
		}
	}

	switch (sig[1]) {
	case 1:
		/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
		return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1,
				     digest, digestlen);
	case 2:
		return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen,
					 digest, digestlen);
	}

	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}

static int
id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct cifs_sid *ssid)
{
	int rc;
	struct key *sidkey;
	struct cifs_sid *ksid;
	unsigned int ksid_size;
	char desc[3 + 10 + 1]; /* 3 byte prefix + 10 bytes for value + NULL */
	const struct cred *saved_cred;

	rc = snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%ci:%u",
			sidtype == SIDOWNER ? 'o' : 'g', cid);
	if (rc >= sizeof(desc))
		return -EINVAL;

	rc = 0;
	saved_cred = override_creds(root_cred);
	sidkey = request_key(&cifs_idmap_key_type, desc, "");
	if (IS_ERR(sidkey)) {
		rc = -EINVAL;
		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Can't map %cid %u to a SID\n",
			 __func__, sidtype == SIDOWNER ? 'u' : 'g', cid);
		goto out_revert_creds;
	} else if (sidkey->datalen < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) {
		rc = -EIO;
		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu)\n",
			 __func__, sidkey->datalen);
		goto invalidate_key;
	}

	/*
	 * A sid is usually too large to be embedded in payload.value, but if
	 * there are no subauthorities and the host has 8-byte pointers, then
	 * it could be.
	 */
	ksid = sidkey->datalen <= sizeof(sidkey->payload) ?
		(struct cifs_sid *)&sidkey->payload :
		(struct cifs_sid *)sidkey->payload.data[0];

	ksid_size = CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + (ksid->num_subauth * sizeof(__le32));
	if (ksid_size > sidkey->datalen) {
		rc = -EIO;
		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu, ksid_size=%u)\n",
			 __func__, sidkey->datalen, ksid_size);
		goto invalidate_key;
	}

	cifs_copy_sid(ssid, ksid);
out_key_put:
	key_put(sidkey);
out_revert_creds:
	revert_creds(saved_cred);
	return rc;

invalidate_key:
	key_invalidate(sidkey);
	goto out_key_put;
}

static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info,
			struct fscrypt_context *ctx, u8 *raw_key,
			const char *prefix, int min_keysize)
{
	char *description;
	struct key *keyring_key;
	struct fscrypt_key *master_key;
	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
	int res;

	description = kasprintf(GFP_NOFS, "%s%*phN", prefix,
				FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
				ctx->master_key_descriptor);
	if (!description)
		return -ENOMEM;

	keyring_key = request_key(&key_type_logon, description, NULL);
	kfree(description);
	if (IS_ERR(keyring_key))
		return PTR_ERR(keyring_key);
	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);

	if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
		printk_once(KERN_WARNING
				"%s: key type must be logon\n", __func__);
		res = -ENOKEY;
		goto out;
	}
	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
	if (!ukp) {
		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
		res = -EKEYREVOKED;
		goto out;
	}
	if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
		res = -EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}
	master_key = (struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data;
	BUILD_BUG_ON(FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);

	if (master_key->size < min_keysize || master_key->size > FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE
	    || master_key->size % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0) {
		printk_once(KERN_WARNING
				"%s: key size incorrect: %d\n",
				__func__, master_key->size);
		res = -ENOKEY;
		goto out;
	}
	res = derive_key_aes(ctx->nonce, master_key, raw_key);
out:
	up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
	key_put(keyring_key);
	return res;
}

/*
 * Request an asymmetric key.
 */
static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
{
	struct key *key;
	char name[12];

	sprintf(name, "id:%08x", keyid);

	pr_debug("key search: \"%s\"\n", name);

	key = get_ima_blacklist_keyring();
	if (key) {
		key_ref_t kref;

		kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(key, 1),
				     &key_type_asymmetric, name);
		if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
			pr_err("Key '%s' is in ima_blacklist_keyring\n", name);
			return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
		}
	}

	if (keyring) {
		/* search in specific keyring */
		key_ref_t kref;

		kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
				      &key_type_asymmetric, name);
		if (IS_ERR(kref))
			key = ERR_CAST(kref);
		else
			key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref);
	} else {
		key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL);
	}

	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
		pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
				   name, PTR_ERR(key));
		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
			/* Hide some search errors */
		case -EACCES:
		case -ENOTDIR:
		case -EAGAIN:
			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
		default:
			return key;
		}
	}

	pr_debug("%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));

	return key;
}

static ssize_t nfs_idmap_request_key(struct key_type *key_type,
				     const char *name, size_t namelen,
				     const char *type, void *data,
				     size_t data_size, struct idmap *idmap)
{
	const struct cred *saved_cred;
	struct key *rkey;
	char *desc;
	struct user_key_payload *payload;
	ssize_t ret;

	ret = nfs_idmap_get_desc(name, namelen, type, strlen(type), &desc);
	if (ret <= 0)
		goto out;

	saved_cred = override_creds(id_resolver_cache);
	if (idmap)
		rkey = request_key_with_auxdata(key_type, desc, "", 0, idmap);
	else
		rkey = request_key(&key_type_id_resolver, desc, "");
	revert_creds(saved_cred);

	kfree(desc);
	if (IS_ERR(rkey)) {
		ret = PTR_ERR(rkey);
		goto out;
	}

	rcu_read_lock();
	rkey->perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;

	ret = key_validate(rkey);
	if (ret < 0)
		goto out_up;

	payload = rcu_dereference(rkey->payload.data);
	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(payload)) {
		ret = PTR_ERR(payload);
		goto out_up;
	}

	ret = payload->datalen;
	if (ret > 0 && ret <= data_size)
		memcpy(data, payload->data, ret);
	else
		ret = -EINVAL;

out_up:
	rcu_read_unlock();
	key_put(rkey);
out:
	return ret;
}

void KSecretServiceTest::setupKeyring()
{
    const char* KSS_TEST_USER = "USER";
    QVERIFY(qEnvironmentVariableIsSet(KSS_TEST_USER));
    QVERIFY(!qEnvironmentVariableIsEmpty(KSS_TEST_USER));
    auto testUser = qgetenv(KSS_TEST_USER);

    const char* KSS_TEST_PASSWORD = "KSS_TEST_PASSWORD";
    QVERIFY(qEnvironmentVariableIsSet(KSS_TEST_PASSWORD));
    QVERIFY(!qEnvironmentVariableIsEmpty(KSS_TEST_PASSWORD));
    auto testPass = qgetenv(KSS_TEST_PASSWORD);

    const char* KEYNAME_ENCRYPTING = "ksecrets-test:encrypting";
    const char* KEYNAME_MAC = "ksecrets-test:mac";

    /* second prevention measure - change keyring keynames */
    sharedConfig->group(QLatin1String("keyring"))
        .writeEntry("keyname_encrypt", KEYNAME_ENCRYPTING);
    sharedConfig->group(QLatin1String("keyring"))
        .writeEntry("keyname_mac", KEYNAME_MAC);

    /* third prevention measure - the encrypting key should not be present
     * into the kernel keyring */
    key_serial_t key;
    key = request_key("user", KEYNAME_ENCRYPTING, 0, KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
    QVERIFY(-1 == key);

    /* now go setup user's keyring */
    QVERIFY(1 == kss_set_credentials(testUser.constData(), testPass.constData(), secretsFilePath.toLocal8Bit().constData()));

    // the right keys should be present into the kernel keyring
    key = request_key("user", KEYNAME_ENCRYPTING, 0, KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
    QVERIFY(-1 != key);
    key = request_key("user", KEYNAME_MAC, 0, KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
    QVERIFY(-1 != key);
}

static void do_test(void)
{
	key_serial_t key;

	key = add_key("user", "ltptestkey", "a", 1, KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);
	if (key == -1)
		tst_brk(TBROK, "Failed to add key");

	request_key("keyring", "foo", "bar", KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING);

	TEST(keyctl(KEYCTL_UNLINK, key, KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING));
	if (TEST_RETURN)
		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "keyctl unlink failed");
	else
		tst_res(TPASS, "Bug not reproduced");
}

/*
 * request_user_key - request the user key
 *
 * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key.
 */
static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_key,
				    size_t *master_keylen)
{
	const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
	struct key *ukey;

	ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
	if (IS_ERR(ukey))
		goto error;

	down_read(&ukey->sem);
	upayload = user_key_payload(ukey);
	*master_key = upayload->data;
	*master_keylen = upayload->datalen;
error:
	return ukey;
}

struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
				u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
{
	struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
	struct key *tkey;

	tkey = request_key(&key_type_trusted, trusted_desc, NULL);
	if (IS_ERR(tkey))
		goto error;

	down_read(&tkey->sem);
	tpayload = tkey->payload.data;
	*master_key = tpayload->key;
	*master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
error:
	return tkey;
}

static void verify_request_key(unsigned int n)
{
	struct test_case *tc = tcases + n;

	TEST(request_key("keyring", tc->des, NULL, *tc->id));
	if (TST_RET != -1) {
		tst_res(TFAIL, "request_key() succeed unexpectly");
		return;
	}

	if (TST_ERR == tc->exp_err) {
		tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "request_key() failed expectly");
		return;
	}

	tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "request_key() failed unexpectly, "
		"expected %s", tst_strerrno(tc->exp_err));
}

/* get secret from key store */
static int get_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *dst, const char *name) {
	struct key *ukey;
	int key_err;
	int err = 0;
	struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;

	ukey = request_key(&key_type_ceph, name, NULL);
	if (!ukey || IS_ERR(ukey)) {
		/* request_key errors don't map nicely to mount(2)
		   errors; don't even try, but still printk */
		key_err = PTR_ERR(ukey);
		switch (key_err) {
		case -ENOKEY:
			pr_warn("ceph: Mount failed due to key not found: %s\n",
				name);
			break;
		case -EKEYEXPIRED:
			pr_warn("ceph: Mount failed due to expired key: %s\n",
				name);
			break;
		case -EKEYREVOKED:
			pr_warn("ceph: Mount failed due to revoked key: %s\n",
				name);
			break;
		default:
			pr_warn("ceph: Mount failed due to unknown key error %d: %s\n",
				key_err, name);
		}
		err = -EPERM;
		goto out;
	}

	ckey = ukey->payload.data[0];
	err = ceph_crypto_key_clone(dst, ckey);
	if (err)
		goto out_key;
	/* pass through, err is 0 */

out_key:
	key_put(ukey);
out:
	return err;
}

char* getKey(char *login)
{
    char buffer[255];
    memset(buffer,0,sizeof(buffer));
    int ret;
    // ищем номер пользовательского ключа
    ret = request_key("user", login, NULL, 0);
    if (ret < 0)
    {
        return "";
    };

    // Возвращаем значение ключа
    ret = keyctl_read(ret, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
    if (ret < 0)
    {
        return "";
    };
    return buffer;
};

int clearKey(char *login)
{
    int ret;
    key_serial_t dest;
    dest = KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING;
    // ищем номер пользовательского ключа
    ret = request_key("user", login, NULL, 0);
    if (ret < 0)
    {
        return 1;
    };

    // удаляем ключ
    ret = keyctl_unlink(ret, dest);
    if (ret < 0)
    {
        return 1;
    };
    return 0;
};

static struct key *nfs_idmap_request_key(const char *name, size_t namelen,
					 const char *type, struct idmap *idmap)
{
	char *desc;
	struct key *rkey;
	ssize_t ret;

	ret = nfs_idmap_get_desc(name, namelen, type, strlen(type), &desc);
	if (ret <= 0)
		return ERR_PTR(ret);

	rkey = request_key(&key_type_id_resolver, desc, "");
	if (IS_ERR(rkey)) {
		mutex_lock(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
		rkey = request_key_with_auxdata(&key_type_id_resolver_legacy,
						desc, "", 0, idmap);
		mutex_unlock(&idmap->idmap_mutex);
	}
	if (!IS_ERR(rkey))
		set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);

	kfree(desc);
	return rkey;
}

struct key *afs_request_key(struct afs_cell *cell)
{
	struct key *key;

	_enter("{%x}", key_serial(cell->anonymous_key));

	_debug("key %s", cell->anonymous_key->description);
	key = request_key(&key_type_rxrpc, cell->anonymous_key->description,
			  NULL);
	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
		if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY) {
			_leave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
			return key;
		}

		
		_leave(" = {%x} [anon]", key_serial(cell->anonymous_key));
		return key_get(cell->anonymous_key);
	} else {
		
		_leave(" = {%x} [auth]", key_serial(key));
		return key;
	}
}

/*
 * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
 */
int evm_init_key(void)
{
	struct key *evm_key;
	struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
	int rc = 0;

	evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
	if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
		return -ENOENT;

	down_read(&evm_key->sem);
	ekp = evm_key->payload.data;
	if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
		rc = -EINVAL;
		goto out;
	}
	memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
out:
	/* burn the original key contents */
	memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
	up_read(&evm_key->sem);
	key_put(evm_key);
	return rc;
}

/**
 * dns_query - Query the DNS
 * @type: Query type (or NULL for straight host->IP lookup)
 * @name: Name to look up
 * @namelen: Length of name
 * @options: Request options (or NULL if no options)
 * @_result: Where to place the returned data (or NULL)
 * @_expiry: Where to store the result expiry time (or NULL)
 *
 * The data will be returned in the pointer at *result, if provided, and the
 * caller is responsible for freeing it.
 *
 * The description should be of the form "[<query_type>:]<domain_name>", and
 * the options need to be appropriate for the query type requested.  If no
 * query_type is given, then the query is a straight hostname to IP address
 * lookup.
 *
 * The DNS resolution lookup is performed by upcalling to userspace by way of
 * requesting a key of type dns_resolver.
 *
 * Returns the size of the result on success, -ve error code otherwise.
 */
int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen,
	      const char *options, char **_result, time64_t *_expiry)
{
	struct key *rkey;
	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
	const struct cred *saved_cred;
	size_t typelen, desclen;
	char *desc, *cp;
	int ret, len;

	kenter("%s,%*.*s,%zu,%s",
	       type, (int)namelen, (int)namelen, name, namelen, options);

	if (!name || namelen == 0)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* construct the query key description as "[<type>:]<name>" */
	typelen = 0;
	desclen = 0;
	if (type) {
		typelen = strlen(type);
		if (typelen < 1)
			return -EINVAL;
		desclen += typelen + 1;
	}

	if (!namelen)
		namelen = strnlen(name, 256);
	if (namelen < 3 || namelen > 255)
		return -EINVAL;
	desclen += namelen + 1;

	desc = kmalloc(desclen, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!desc)
		return -ENOMEM;

	cp = desc;
	if (type) {
		memcpy(cp, type, typelen);
		cp += typelen;
		*cp++ = ':';
	}
	memcpy(cp, name, namelen);
	cp += namelen;
	*cp = '\0';

	if (!options)
		options = "";
	kdebug("call request_key(,%s,%s)", desc, options);

	/* make the upcall, using special credentials to prevent the use of
	 * add_key() to preinstall malicious redirections
	 */
	saved_cred = override_creds(dns_resolver_cache);
	rkey = request_key(&key_type_dns_resolver, desc, options);
	revert_creds(saved_cred);
	kfree(desc);
	if (IS_ERR(rkey)) {
		ret = PTR_ERR(rkey);
		goto out;
	}

	down_read(&rkey->sem);
	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, &rkey->flags);
	rkey->perm |= KEY_USR_VIEW;

	ret = key_validate(rkey);
	if (ret < 0)
		goto put;

	/* If the DNS server gave an error, return that to the caller */
	ret = PTR_ERR(rkey->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
	if (ret)
		goto put;

	upayload = user_key_payload_locked(rkey);
	len = upayload->datalen;

//.........这里部分代码省略.........