C++ EC_POINT_clear_free函数代码示例

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本文整理汇总了C++中EC_POINT_clear_free函数的典型用法代码示例。如果您正苦于以下问题：C++ EC_POINT_clear_free函数的具体用法？C++ EC_POINT_clear_free怎么用？C++ EC_POINT_clear_free使用的例子？那么恭喜您, 这里精选的函数代码示例或许可以为您提供帮助。

在下文中一共展示了EC_POINT_clear_free函数的20个代码示例，这些例子默认根据受欢迎程度排序。您可以为喜欢或者感觉有用的代码点赞，您的评价将有助于我们的系统推荐出更棒的C++代码示例。

示例1: eap_pwd_reset

static void eap_pwd_reset(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
	struct eap_pwd_data *data = priv;

	BN_clear_free(data->private_value);
	BN_clear_free(data->peer_scalar);
	BN_clear_free(data->my_scalar);
	BN_clear_free(data->k);
	BN_CTX_free(data->bnctx);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(data->my_element);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(data->peer_element);
	bin_clear_free(data->id_peer, data->id_peer_len);
	bin_clear_free(data->id_server, data->id_server_len);
	bin_clear_free(data->password, data->password_len);
	if (data->grp) {
		EC_GROUP_free(data->grp->group);
		EC_POINT_clear_free(data->grp->pwe);
		BN_clear_free(data->grp->order);
		BN_clear_free(data->grp->prime);
		os_free(data->grp);
	}
	wpabuf_free(data->inbuf);
	wpabuf_free(data->outbuf);
	bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}

开发者ID:earlchew，项目名称:hostap，代码行数:25，代码来源:eap_server_pwd.c

示例2: MKEM_decode_message

int
MKEM_decode_message(const MKEM *kp, uint8_t *secret, const uint8_t *message)
{
  int use_curve0 = !(message[0] & kp->params->curve_bit);
  const EC_GROUP *ca = use_curve0 ? kp->params->c0 : kp->params->c1;
  const BIGNUM *sa = use_curve0 ? kp->s0 : kp->s1;
  EC_POINT *q = 0, *r = 0;
  uint8_t *unpadded = 0;
  BIGNUM x, y;
  size_t mlen = kp->params->msgsize;
  int rv;

  if (!kp->s0 || !kp->s1) /* secret key not available */
    return -1;

  BN_init(&x);
  BN_init(&y);
  FAILZ(q = EC_POINT_new(ca));
  FAILZ(r = EC_POINT_new(ca));
  FAILZ(unpadded = malloc(mlen + 1));

  /* Copy the message, erase the padding bits, and put an 0x02 byte on
     the front so we can use EC_POINT_oct2point to recover the
     y-coordinate. */
  unpadded[0] = 0x02;
  unpadded[1] = (message[0] & ~(kp->params->pad_mask|kp->params->curve_bit));
  memcpy(&unpadded[2], &message[1], mlen - 1);

  FAILZ(EC_POINT_oct2point(ca, q, unpadded, mlen + 1,
                           kp->params->ctx));
  FAILZ(EC_POINT_mul(ca, r, 0, q, sa, kp->params->ctx));

  FAILZ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(ca, q, &x, &y, kp->params->ctx));
  if (bn2bin_padhi(&x, secret, mlen) != mlen)
    goto fail;

  FAILZ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(ca, r, &x, &y, kp->params->ctx));
  if (bn2bin_padhi(&x, secret + mlen, mlen) != mlen)
    goto fail;

  rv = 0;
 done:
  if (unpadded) {
    memset(unpadded, 0, mlen + 1);
    free(unpadded);
  }
  if (q) EC_POINT_clear_free(q);
  if (r) EC_POINT_clear_free(r);
  BN_clear(&x);
  BN_clear(&y);
  return rv;

 fail:
  rv = -1;
  memset(secret, 0, mlen * 2);
  goto done;
}

开发者ID:zackw，项目名称:moeller-ref，代码行数:57，代码来源:mref-o.c

示例3: MKEM_teardown

void
MKEM_teardown(MKEM *kp)
{
  /* s0 and s1 are secret. p0 and p1 are not secret, but clear them
     anyway. */
  if (kp->s0) BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)kp->s0);
  if (kp->s1) BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)kp->s1);

  if (kp->p0) EC_POINT_clear_free((EC_POINT *)kp->p0);
  if (kp->p1) EC_POINT_clear_free((EC_POINT *)kp->p1);

  memset(kp, 0, sizeof(MKEM));
}

开发者ID:zackw，项目名称:moeller-ref，代码行数:13，代码来源:mref-o.c

示例4: _free_pwd_session

static int _free_pwd_session (pwd_session_t *session)
{
	BN_clear_free(session->private_value);
	BN_clear_free(session->peer_scalar);
	BN_clear_free(session->my_scalar);
	BN_clear_free(session->k);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(session->my_element);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(session->peer_element);
	EC_GROUP_free(session->group);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(session->pwe);
	BN_clear_free(session->order);
	BN_clear_free(session->prime);

	return 0;
}

开发者ID:janetuk，项目名称:freeradius，代码行数:15，代码来源:rlm_eap_pwd.c

示例5: ec_pre_comp_clear_free

static void ec_pre_comp_clear_free(void *pre_)
{
    int i;
    EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_;

    if (!pre)
        return;

    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, -1, &i, pre->lock);
    if (i > 0)
        return;

    CRYPTO_thread_cleanup(pre->lock);
    if (pre->points) {
        EC_POINT **p;

        for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++) {
            EC_POINT_clear_free(*p);
            vigortls_zeroize(p, sizeof *p);
        }
        free(pre->points);
    }
    vigortls_zeroize(pre, sizeof *pre);
    free(pre);
}

开发者ID:vigortls，项目名称:vigortls，代码行数:25，代码来源:ec_mult.c

示例6: EC_GROUP_clear_free

void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
	{
	if (!group) return;

	if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
		group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
	else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
		group->meth->group_finish(group);

	EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);

	if (group->generator != NULL)
		EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
	BN_clear_free(&group->order);
	BN_clear_free(&group->cofactor);

	if (group->seed)
		{
		OPENSSL_cleanse(group->seed, group->seed_len);
		OPENSSL_free(group->seed);
		}

	OPENSSL_cleanse(group, sizeof *group);
	OPENSSL_free(group);
	}

开发者ID:LucidOne，项目名称:Rovio，代码行数:25，代码来源:ec_lib.c

示例7: ms_deleteParameterSets

/***************************************************************************//**
 * Delete all Mikey Sakke parameter set data.
 ******************************************************************************/
void ms_deleteParameterSets() {

    int c = 0;
    for (c = 0; c <  MAX_ES_PARAMETER_SETS; c++) {
        if (NULL != ms_parameter_sets[c].p) {
            BN_clear_free(ms_parameter_sets[c].p);
        }
        if (NULL != ms_parameter_sets[c].q) {
            BN_clear_free(ms_parameter_sets[c].q);
        }
        if (NULL != ms_parameter_sets[c].Px) {
            BN_clear_free(ms_parameter_sets[c].Px);
        }
        if (NULL != ms_parameter_sets[c].Py) {
            BN_clear_free(ms_parameter_sets[c].Py);
        }
        if (NULL != ms_parameter_sets[c].g) {
            BN_clear_free(ms_parameter_sets[c].g);
        }
        if (NULL != ms_parameter_sets[c].E) {
            EC_GROUP_clear_free(ms_parameter_sets[c].E);
        }
        if (NULL != ms_parameter_sets[c].P) {
            EC_POINT_clear_free(ms_parameter_sets[c].P);
        }
        memset(&ms_parameter_sets[c], 0, sizeof(struct msParameterSet_t));
    }
    ms_parameter_sets_initialised = ES_FALSE;

} /* ms_deleteParameterSets */

开发者ID:jim-b，项目名称:ECCSI-SAKKE，代码行数:33，代码来源:mikeySakkeParameters.c

示例8: EC_POINT_bn2point

EC_POINT *
EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP * group,
    const BIGNUM * bn, EC_POINT * point, BN_CTX * ctx)
{
	size_t buf_len = 0;
	unsigned char *buf;
	EC_POINT *ret;

	if ((buf_len = BN_num_bytes(bn)) == 0)
		return NULL;
	buf = malloc(buf_len);
	if (buf == NULL)
		return NULL;

	if (!BN_bn2bin(bn, buf)) {
		free(buf);
		return NULL;
	}
	if (point == NULL) {
		if ((ret = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
			free(buf);
			return NULL;
		}
	} else
		ret = point;

	if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, ret, buf, buf_len, ctx)) {
		if (point == NULL)
			EC_POINT_clear_free(ret);
		free(buf);
		return NULL;
	}
	free(buf);
	return ret;
}

开发者ID:Basskrapfen，项目名称:openbsd，代码行数:35，代码来源:ec_print.c

示例9: ec_pre_comp_clear_free

static void ec_pre_comp_clear_free(void *pre_)
	{
	int i;
	EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_;

	if (!pre)
		return;

	i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP);
	if (i > 0)
		return;

	if (pre->points)
		{
		EC_POINT **p;

		for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++)
			{
			EC_POINT_clear_free(*p);
			OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof *p);
			}
		OPENSSL_free(pre->points);
		}
	OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
	OPENSSL_free(pre);
	}

开发者ID:YesWant，项目名称:HX123S，代码行数:26，代码来源:ec_mult.c

示例10: MKEM_init_pk_vec

int
MKEM_init_pk_vec(MKEM *kp,
                 const MKEMParams *params,
                 const uint8_t *p0, size_t p0l,
                 const uint8_t *p1, size_t p1l)
{
  EC_POINT *pp0 = EC_POINT_new(params->c0);
  EC_POINT *pp1 = EC_POINT_new(params->c1);

  FAILZ(pp0); FAILZ(pp1);
  FAILZ(EC_POINT_oct2point(params->c0, pp0, p0, p0l, params->ctx));
  FAILZ(EC_POINT_oct2point(params->c1, pp1, p1, p1l, params->ctx));

  return MKEM_init_pk_point(kp, params, pp0, pp1);

 fail:
  if (pp0) EC_POINT_clear_free(pp0);
  if (pp1) EC_POINT_clear_free(pp1);
  return -1;
}

开发者ID:zackw，项目名称:moeller-ref，代码行数:20，代码来源:mref-o.c

示例11: EC_GROUP_clear_free

void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
    if (!group)
        return;

    if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
        group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
    else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
        group->meth->group_finish(group);

    EC_pre_comp_free(group);
    BN_MONT_CTX_free(group->mont_data);
    EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
    BN_clear_free(group->order);
    BN_clear_free(group->cofactor);
    OPENSSL_clear_free(group->seed, group->seed_len);
    OPENSSL_clear_free(group, sizeof(*group));
}

开发者ID:Castaglia，项目名称:openssl，代码行数:18，代码来源:ec_lib.c

示例12: ec_group_copy

int ec_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src) {
  if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
    return 0;
  }
  if (dest->meth != src->meth) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
    return 0;
  }
  if (dest == src) {
    return 1;
  }

  ec_pre_comp_free(dest->pre_comp);
  dest->pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp);

  if (src->generator != NULL) {
    if (dest->generator == NULL) {
      dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest);
      if (dest->generator == NULL) {
        return 0;
      }
    }
    if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator)) {
      return 0;
    }
  } else {
    /* src->generator == NULL */
    if (dest->generator != NULL) {
      EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator);
      dest->generator = NULL;
    }
  }

  if (!BN_copy(&dest->order, &src->order) ||
      !BN_copy(&dest->cofactor, &src->cofactor)) {
    return 0;
  }

  dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;

  return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src);
}

开发者ID:luocn99，项目名称:tgw-boringssl，代码行数:43，代码来源:ec.c

示例13: EC_GROUP_clear_free

void 
EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP * group)
{
	if (!group)
		return;

	if (group->meth->group_clear_finish != 0)
		group->meth->group_clear_finish(group);
	else if (group->meth->group_finish != 0)
		group->meth->group_finish(group);

	EC_EX_DATA_clear_free_all_data(&group->extra_data);

	EC_POINT_clear_free(group->generator);
	BN_clear_free(&group->order);
	BN_clear_free(&group->cofactor);

	if (group->seed) {
		explicit_bzero(group->seed, group->seed_len);
		free(group->seed);
	}
	explicit_bzero(group, sizeof *group);
	free(group);
}

开发者ID:LucaBongiorni，项目名称:nextgen，代码行数:24，代码来源:ec_lib.c

示例14: input_kex_ecdh_reply


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
	    (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
	    server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) {
		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
		goto out;
	}
	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) {
		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
		goto out;
	}

	/* Q_S, server public key */
	/* signed H */
	if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
		goto out;
	}
	if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, server_public, group)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
		goto out;

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
#endif
	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0) {
		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid server public key");
		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
		goto out;
	}

	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
		goto out;
	}
	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
	    client_key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
		goto out;
	}

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
	/* calc and verify H */
	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
	if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash(
	    kex->hash_alg,
	    group,
	    kex->client_version_string,
	    kex->server_version_string,
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my),
	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer),
	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
	    server_public,
	    shared_secret,
	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
		goto out;

	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
	    hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0)
		goto out;

	/* save session id */
	if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
		kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
		kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
		if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
			goto out;
		}
		memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
	}

	if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 out:
	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
	if (kex->ec_client_key) {
		EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
		kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
	}
	if (server_public)
		EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
	if (kbuf) {
		explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen);
		free(kbuf);
	}
	if (shared_secret)
		BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
	free(server_host_key_blob);
	free(signature);
	return r;
}

开发者ID:randombit，项目名称:hacrypto，代码行数:101，代码来源:kexecdhc.c

示例15: kexecdh_client

void
kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
{
	EC_KEY *client_key;
	EC_POINT *server_public;
	const EC_GROUP *group;
	BIGNUM *shared_secret;
	Key *server_host_key;
	u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
	u_char *kbuf, *hash;
	u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;

	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1)
		fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
	group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);

	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
	packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key));
	packet_send();
	debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
	key_dump_ec_key(client_key);
#endif

	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
	packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);

	/* hostkey */
	server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
	server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
	if (server_host_key == NULL)
		fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
		fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
		fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
		fatal("server_host_key verification failed");

	/* Q_S, server public key */
	if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
	packet_get_ecpoint(group, server_public);

	if (key_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0)
		fatal("%s: invalid server public key", __func__);

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
	key_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
#endif

	/* signed H */
	signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
	packet_check_eom();

	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
	    client_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
		fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
	if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
	free(kbuf);

	/* calc and verify H */
	kex_ecdh_hash(
	    kex->evp_md,
	    group,
	    kex->client_version_string,
	    kex->server_version_string,
	    buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
	    buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
	    server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
	    server_public,
	    shared_secret,
	    &hash, &hashlen
	);
	free(server_host_key_blob);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
	EC_KEY_free(client_key);

	if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
		fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
	key_free(server_host_key);
	free(signature);

	/* save session id */
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

开发者ID:ChaosJohn，项目名称:freebsd，代码行数:101，代码来源:kexecdhc.c

示例16: EC_GROUP_copy

int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
{
    if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
        return 0;
    }
    if (dest->meth != src->meth) {
        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
        return 0;
    }
    if (dest == src)
        return 1;

    /* Copy precomputed */
    dest->pre_comp_type = src->pre_comp_type;
    switch (src->pre_comp_type) {
    case PCT_none:
        dest->pre_comp.ec = NULL;
        break;
    case PCT_nistz256:
#ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
        dest->pre_comp.nistz256 = EC_nistz256_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistz256);
#endif
        break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
    case PCT_nistp224:
        dest->pre_comp.nistp224 = EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp224);
        break;
    case PCT_nistp256:
        dest->pre_comp.nistp256 = EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp256);
        break;
    case PCT_nistp521:
        dest->pre_comp.nistp521 = EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.nistp521);
        break;
#else
    case PCT_nistp224:
    case PCT_nistp256:
    case PCT_nistp521:
        break;
#endif
    case PCT_ec:
        dest->pre_comp.ec = EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(src->pre_comp.ec);
        break;
    }

    if (src->mont_data != NULL) {
        if (dest->mont_data == NULL) {
            dest->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
            if (dest->mont_data == NULL)
                return 0;
        }
        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->mont_data, src->mont_data))
            return 0;
    } else {
        /* src->generator == NULL */
        BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont_data);
        dest->mont_data = NULL;
    }

    if (src->generator != NULL) {
        if (dest->generator == NULL) {
            dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest);
            if (dest->generator == NULL)
                return 0;
        }
        if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator))
            return 0;
    } else {
        /* src->generator == NULL */
        EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator);
        dest->generator = NULL;
    }

    if ((src->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0) {
        if (!BN_copy(dest->order, src->order))
            return 0;
        if (!BN_copy(dest->cofactor, src->cofactor))
            return 0;
    }

    dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
    dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag;
    dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form;

    if (src->seed) {
        OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
        dest->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(src->seed_len);
        if (dest->seed == NULL)
            return 0;
        if (!memcpy(dest->seed, src->seed, src->seed_len))
            return 0;
        dest->seed_len = src->seed_len;
    } else {
        OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
        dest->seed = NULL;
        dest->seed_len = 0;
    }

    return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src);
}

开发者ID:Castaglia，项目名称:openssl，代码行数:100，代码来源:ec_lib.c

示例17: compute_password_element


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
        eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
        eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
        eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
        eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);

        BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN, rnd);

        if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
                        (u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
                        os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
                        prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
            goto fail;

        BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);

        /*
         * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but
         * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
         * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8
         * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now
         * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
         */
        if (primebitlen % 8)
            BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate,
                      (8 - (primebitlen % 8)));

        if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, grp->prime) >= 0)
            continue;

        wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
                    prfbuf, primebytelen);

        /*
         * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
         * one...
         */
        if (BN_is_odd(rnd))
            is_odd = 1;
        else
            is_odd = 0;

        /*
         * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
         * don't have a point
         */
        if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(grp->group,
                grp->pwe,
                x_candidate,
                is_odd, NULL))
            continue;
        /*
         * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
         * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
         * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
         * hurt just to be sure.
         */
        if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL)) {
            wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
            continue;
        }

        if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
            /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
            if (!EC_POINT_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL, grp->pwe,
                              cofactor, NULL)) {
                wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: cannot "
                           "multiply generator by order");
                continue;
            }
            if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
                wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at "
                           "infinity");
                continue;
            }
        }
        /* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
        break;
    }
    wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
    grp->group_num = num;
    if (0) {
fail:
        EC_GROUP_free(grp->group);
        grp->group = NULL;
        EC_POINT_clear_free(grp->pwe);
        grp->pwe = NULL;
        BN_clear_free(grp->order);
        grp->order = NULL;
        BN_clear_free(grp->prime);
        grp->prime = NULL;
        ret = 1;
    }
    /* cleanliness and order.... */
    BN_clear_free(cofactor);
    BN_clear_free(x_candidate);
    BN_clear_free(rnd);
    os_free(prfbuf);

    return ret;
}

开发者ID:XianliangJ，项目名称:Mininet-WiFi，代码行数:101，代码来源:eap_pwd_common.c

示例18: process_peer_commit


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
	data_len = BN_num_bytes(session->prime);

	/*
	 *	Did the peer send enough data?
	 */
	if (in_len < (2 * data_len + BN_num_bytes(session->order))) {
		REDEBUG("Invalid commit packet");
		goto finish;
	}

	BN_bin2bn(ptr, data_len, x);
	ptr += data_len;
	BN_bin2bn(ptr, data_len, y);
	ptr += data_len;

	data_len = BN_num_bytes(session->order);
	BN_bin2bn(ptr, data_len, session->peer_scalar);

	/* validate received scalar */
	if (BN_is_zero(session->peer_scalar) ||
	    BN_is_one(session->peer_scalar) ||
	    BN_cmp(session->peer_scalar, session->order) >= 0) {
		REDEBUG("Peer's scalar is not within the allowed range");
		goto finish;
	}

	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
		REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* validate received element */
	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(session->group, session->peer_element, bn_ctx) ||
	    EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, session->peer_element)) {
		REDEBUG("Peer's element is not a point on the elliptic curve");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, point, NULL, session->peer_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
			REDEBUG("Unable to multiply element by co-factor");
			goto finish;
		}

		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, point)) {
			REDEBUG("Peer's element is in small sub-group");
			goto finish;
		}
	}

	/* detect reflection attacks */
	if (BN_cmp(session->peer_scalar, session->my_scalar) == 0 ||
	    EC_POINT_cmp(session->group, session->peer_element, session->my_element, bn_ctx) == 0) {
		REDEBUG("Reflection attack detected");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* compute the shared key, k */
	if ((!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, session->pwe, session->peer_scalar, bn_ctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_add(session->group, K, K, session->peer_element, bn_ctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, K, session->private_value, bn_ctx))) {
		REDEBUG("Unable to compute shared key, k");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, K, cofactor, NULL)) {
			REDEBUG("Unable to multiply k by co-factor");
			goto finish;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
	 * co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
	 * never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
	 * sure" so let's be safe.
	 */
	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, K)) {
		REDEBUG("K is point-at-infinity");
		goto finish;
	}

	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, K, session->k, NULL, bn_ctx)) {
		REDEBUG("Unable to get shared secret from K");
		goto finish;
	}
	ret = 0;

finish:
	EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
	BN_clear_free(cofactor);
	BN_clear_free(x);
	BN_clear_free(y);

	return ret;
}

开发者ID:FreeRADIUS，项目名称:freeradius-server，代码行数:101，代码来源:eap_pwd.c

示例19: MKEM_generate_message_u

int
MKEM_generate_message_u(const MKEM *kp, const BIGNUM *uraw, uint8_t pad,
                        uint8_t *secret, uint8_t *message)
{
  BIGNUM u, x, y;
  int use_curve0 = (BN_cmp(uraw, kp->params->n0) < 0);
  const EC_GROUP *ca;
  const EC_POINT *ga;
  const EC_POINT *pa;
  EC_POINT *q = 0, *r = 0;
  size_t mlen = kp->params->msgsize;
  int rv;

  BN_init(&u);
  BN_init(&x);
  BN_init(&y);

  if (use_curve0) {
    ca = kp->params->c0;
    ga = kp->params->g0;
    pa = kp->p0;
    FAILZ(BN_copy(&u, uraw));
  } else {
    ca = kp->params->c1;
    ga = kp->params->g1;
    pa = kp->p1;
    FAILZ(BN_sub(&u, uraw, kp->params->n0));
    FAILZ(BN_add(&u, &u, BN_value_one()));
  }

  FAILZ(q = EC_POINT_new(ca));
  FAILZ(r = EC_POINT_new(ca));
  FAILZ(EC_POINT_mul(ca, q, 0, ga, &u, kp->params->ctx));
  FAILZ(EC_POINT_mul(ca, r, 0, pa, &u, kp->params->ctx));

  FAILZ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(ca, q, &x, &y, kp->params->ctx));
  if (bn2bin_padhi(&x, message, mlen) != mlen)
    goto fail;
  if (message[0] & (kp->params->pad_mask|kp->params->curve_bit)) /* see below */
    goto fail;
  memcpy(secret, message, mlen);

  FAILZ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(ca, r, &x, &y, kp->params->ctx));
  if (bn2bin_padhi(&x, secret + mlen, mlen) != mlen)
    goto fail;

  /* K high bits of the message will be zero.  Fill in the high K-1
     of them with random bits from the pad, and use the lowest bit
     to identify the curve in use.  That bit will have a bias on the
     order of 2^{-d/2} where d is the bit-degree of the curve; 2^{-81}
     for the only curve presently implemented.  This is acceptably
     small since an elliptic curve of d bits gives only about d/2 bits
     of security anyway, and is much better than allowing a timing
     attack via the recipient having to attempt point decompression
     twice for curve 1 but only once for curve 0 (or, alternatively,
     doubling the time required for all decryptions).  */

  pad &= kp->params->pad_mask;
  pad |= (use_curve0 ? 0 : kp->params->curve_bit);
  message[0] |= pad;

  rv = 0;
 done:
  BN_clear(&u);
  BN_clear(&x);
  BN_clear(&y);
  if (q) EC_POINT_clear_free(q);
  if (r) EC_POINT_clear_free(r);
  return rv;

 fail:
  memset(message, 0, mlen);
  memset(secret, 0, mlen * 2);
  rv = -1;
  goto done;
}

开发者ID:zackw，项目名称:moeller-ref，代码行数:76，代码来源:mref-o.c

示例20: eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
				   "is at infinity!\n");
			goto fin;
		}
	}

	/* compute the shared key, k */
	if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
			   data->server_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_add(data->grp->group, K, K, data->server_element,
			   data->bnctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, K, data->private_value,
			   data->bnctx))) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): computing shared key "
			   "fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, K, cofactor,
				  NULL)) {
			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
				   "shared key point by order");
			goto fin;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
	 * co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
	 * never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
	 * sure" so let's be safe.
	 */
	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, K)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): shared key point is at "
			   "infinity!\n");
		goto fin;
	}

	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group, K, data->k,
						 NULL, data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): unable to extract "
			   "shared secret from point");
		goto fin;
	}

	/* now do the response */
	if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
						 data->my_element, x, y,
						 data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): point assignment fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	if (((scalar = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order))) == NULL) ||
	    ((element = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) * 2)) ==
	     NULL)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): data allocation fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/*
	 * bignums occupy as little memory as possible so one that is
	 * sufficiently smaller than the prime or order might need pre-pending
	 * with zeros.
	 */
	os_memset(scalar, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));
	os_memset(element, 0, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) * 2);
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) -
		BN_num_bytes(data->my_scalar);
	BN_bn2bin(data->my_scalar, scalar + offset);

	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
	BN_bn2bin(x, element + offset);
	offset = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
	BN_bn2bin(y, element + BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime) + offset);

	data->outbuf = wpabuf_alloc(BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order) +
				    2 * BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	if (data->outbuf == NULL)
		goto fin;

	/* we send the element as (x,y) follwed by the scalar */
	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, element,
			2 * BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, scalar, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order));

fin:
	os_free(scalar);
	os_free(element);
	BN_clear_free(x);
	BN_clear_free(y);
	BN_clear_free(cofactor);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
	EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
	if (data->outbuf == NULL)
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
	else
		eap_pwd_state(data, PWD_Confirm_Req);
}

开发者ID:daddy366，项目名称:anarchy-wpa-supplicant-8，代码行数:101，代码来源:eap_pwd.c

注：本文中的EC_POINT_clear_free函数示例整理自Github/MSDocs等源码及文档管理平台，相关代码片段筛选自各路编程大神贡献的开源项目，源码版权归原作者所有，传播和使用请参考对应项目的License；未经允许，请勿转载。

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C++ EC_POINT_clear_free函数代码示例

示例1: eap_pwd_reset

示例2: MKEM_decode_message

示例3: MKEM_teardown

示例4: _free_pwd_session

示例5: ec_pre_comp_clear_free

示例6: EC_GROUP_clear_free

示例7: ms_deleteParameterSets

示例8: EC_POINT_bn2point

示例9: ec_pre_comp_clear_free

示例10: MKEM_init_pk_vec

示例11: EC_GROUP_clear_free

示例12: ec_group_copy

示例13: EC_GROUP_clear_free

示例14: input_kex_ecdh_reply

示例15: kexecdh_client

示例16: EC_GROUP_copy

示例17: compute_password_element

示例18: process_peer_commit

示例19: MKEM_generate_message_u

示例20: eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange

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