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C++ EC_POINT_is_at_infinity函数代码示例

原作者: [db:作者] 来自: [db:来源] 收藏 邀请

本文整理汇总了C++中EC_POINT_is_at_infinity函数的典型用法代码示例。如果您正苦于以下问题:C++ EC_POINT_is_at_infinity函数的具体用法?C++ EC_POINT_is_at_infinity怎么用?C++ EC_POINT_is_at_infinity使用的例子?那么恭喜您, 这里精选的函数代码示例或许可以为您提供帮助。



在下文中一共展示了EC_POINT_is_at_infinity函数的20个代码示例,这些例子默认根据受欢迎程度排序。您可以为喜欢或者感觉有用的代码点赞,您的评价将有助于我们的系统推荐出更棒的C++代码示例。

示例1: compute_password_element


//.........这里部分代码省略.........

	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(session->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
		REDEBUG("unable to get cofactor for curve");
		goto error;
	}

	prime_bit_len = BN_num_bits(session->prime);
	prime_byte_len = BN_num_bytes(session->prime);
	MEM(prf_buf = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, prime_byte_len));
	MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
	ctr = 0;
	for (;;) {
		if (ctr > 10) {
			REDEBUG("Unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy", grp_num);
			goto error;
		}
		ctr++;

		/*
		 * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
		 *    pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
		 *		   counter)
		 */
		HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)token, sizeof(*token));
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_peer, id_peer_len);
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_server, id_server_len);
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)password, password_len);
		HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&ctr, sizeof(ctr));
		pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, pwe_digest);

		BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, rnd);
		eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
			    strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"), prf_buf, prime_bit_len);

		BN_bin2bn(prf_buf, prime_byte_len, x_candidate);
		/*
		 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..prime_bit_len but
		 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
		 * number. If the prime_bit_len is not an even multiple of 8
		 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ prime_bit_len-- so now
		 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
		 */
		if (prime_bit_len % 8) BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate, (8 - (prime_bit_len % 8)));
		if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, session->prime) >= 0) continue;

		/*
		 * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
		 * one...
		 */
		is_odd = BN_is_odd(rnd) ? 1 : 0;

		/*
		 * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
		 * don't have a point
		 */
		if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->pwe, x_candidate, is_odd, NULL)) {
			continue;
		}

		/*
		 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
		 * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
		 * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
		 * hurt just to be sure.
		 */
		if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(session->group, session->pwe, NULL)) {
			REDEBUG("Point is not on curve");
			continue;
		}

		if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
			/* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
			if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, session->pwe, NULL, session->pwe,
				cofactor, NULL)) {
				RDEBUG("Cannot multiply generator by order");
				continue;
			}

			if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, session->pwe)) {
				REDEBUG("Point is at infinity");
				continue;
			}
		}
		/* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
		break;
	}

	session->group_num = grp_num;

finish:
	/* cleanliness and order.... */
	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
	BN_clear_free(cofactor);
	BN_clear_free(x_candidate);
	BN_clear_free(rnd);
	talloc_free(prf_buf);

	return ret;
}
开发者ID:FreeRADIUS,项目名称:freeradius-server,代码行数:101,代码来源:eap_pwd.c


示例2: eccDecrypt

// unsigned char *pM      输出,明文
// unsigned char *pPDKey  私钥
// unsigned char *pC      密文
// unsigned long Clen     密文长度
unsigned char eccDecrypt(unsigned char *pM, unsigned char *pPDKey, unsigned char *pC, unsigned long Clen)
{
	EC_KEY *ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_sm2p256v1);
	EC_GROUP *ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_sm2p256v1);

	KDF_FUNC kdf = KDF_get_x9_63(EVP_sm3());

	// 设置私钥
	BIGNUM *pri_key = BN_new();
	BN_bin2bn(pPDKey, 32, pri_key);
	EC_KEY_set_private_key(ec_key, pri_key);

	int ret = 1;
	EC_POINT *point = NULL;
	BIGNUM *n = NULL;
	BIGNUM *h = NULL;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
	EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
	unsigned char buf[(OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 7)/4 + 1];
	unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	unsigned int maclen;
	int nbytes;
	size_t size;
	size_t i;

	if (!ec_group || !pri_key) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!kdf) {
		goto end;
	}

	EC_POINT *ephem_point = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
	EC_POINT_oct2point(ec_group, ephem_point, pC, 65, NULL);

	/* init vars */
	point = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
	n = BN_new();
	h = BN_new();
	bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
	if (!point || !n || !h || !bn_ctx || !md_ctx) {
		goto end;
	}

	/* init ec domain parameters */
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ec_group, n, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(ec_group, h, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	nbytes = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ec_group) + 7) / 8;

	/* B2: check [h]C1 != O */
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, point, NULL, ephem_point, h, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(ec_group, point)) {
		goto end;
	}

	/* B3: compute ECDH [d]C1 = (x2, y2) */	
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, point, NULL, ephem_point, pri_key, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!(size = EC_POINT_point2oct(ec_group, point,
		POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf, sizeof(buf), bn_ctx))) {
			goto end;
	}
	OPENSSL_assert(size == 1 + nbytes * 2);

	/* B4: compute t = KDF(x2 || y2, clen) */

	size_t len = 0;
	size_t *outlen = &len;
	*outlen = Clen - 97; //FIXME: duplicated code
	unsigned char *out = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(*outlen);
	kdf(buf + 1, size - 1, out, outlen);

	unsigned char *ciphertext = pC + 65;

	/* B5: compute M = C2 xor t */
	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
		out[i] ^= ciphertext[i];
	}
	*outlen = len;

	if (1) {

		/* B6: check Hash(x2 || M || y2) == C3 */
		if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_sm3(), NULL)) {
			goto end;
		}
		if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buf + 1, nbytes)) {
			goto end;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:chanuei,项目名称:dmverify-analysis,代码行数:101,代码来源:Tcm_crypto.cpp


示例3: process_peer_commit

int process_peer_commit(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
{
	uint8_t		*ptr;
	size_t		data_len;
	BIGNUM		*x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
	EC_POINT	*K = NULL, *point = NULL;
	int		ret = 1;

	MEM(session->peer_scalar = BN_new());
	MEM(session->k = BN_new());
	MEM(session->peer_element = EC_POINT_new(session->group));
	MEM(point = EC_POINT_new(session->group));
	MEM(K = EC_POINT_new(session->group));

	MEM(cofactor = BN_new());
	MEM(x = BN_new());
	MEM(y = BN_new());

	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(session->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
		REDEBUG("Unable to get group co-factor");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* element, x then y, followed by scalar */
	ptr = (uint8_t *)in;
	data_len = BN_num_bytes(session->prime);

	/*
	 *	Did the peer send enough data?
	 */
	if (in_len < (2 * data_len + BN_num_bytes(session->order))) {
		REDEBUG("Invalid commit packet");
		goto finish;
	}

	BN_bin2bn(ptr, data_len, x);
	ptr += data_len;
	BN_bin2bn(ptr, data_len, y);
	ptr += data_len;

	data_len = BN_num_bytes(session->order);
	BN_bin2bn(ptr, data_len, session->peer_scalar);

	/* validate received scalar */
	if (BN_is_zero(session->peer_scalar) ||
	    BN_is_one(session->peer_scalar) ||
	    BN_cmp(session->peer_scalar, session->order) >= 0) {
		REDEBUG("Peer's scalar is not within the allowed range");
		goto finish;
	}

	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
		REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* validate received element */
	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(session->group, session->peer_element, bn_ctx) ||
	    EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, session->peer_element)) {
		REDEBUG("Peer's element is not a point on the elliptic curve");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, point, NULL, session->peer_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
			REDEBUG("Unable to multiply element by co-factor");
			goto finish;
		}

		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, point)) {
			REDEBUG("Peer's element is in small sub-group");
			goto finish;
		}
	}

	/* detect reflection attacks */
	if (BN_cmp(session->peer_scalar, session->my_scalar) == 0 ||
	    EC_POINT_cmp(session->group, session->peer_element, session->my_element, bn_ctx) == 0) {
		REDEBUG("Reflection attack detected");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* compute the shared key, k */
	if ((!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, session->pwe, session->peer_scalar, bn_ctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_add(session->group, K, K, session->peer_element, bn_ctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, K, session->private_value, bn_ctx))) {
		REDEBUG("Unable to compute shared key, k");
		goto finish;
	}

	/* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, K, NULL, K, cofactor, NULL)) {
			REDEBUG("Unable to multiply k by co-factor");
			goto finish;
		}
	}

	/*
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:FreeRADIUS,项目名称:freeradius-server,代码行数:101,代码来源:eap_pwd.c


示例4: ec_GFp_simple_dbl

int 
ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP * group, EC_POINT * r, const EC_POINT * a, BN_CTX * ctx)
{
	int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
	int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
	const BIGNUM *p;
	BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
	BIGNUM *n0, *n1, *n2, *n3;
	int ret = 0;

	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, a) > 0) {
		BN_zero(&r->Z);
		r->Z_is_one = 0;
		return 1;
	}
	field_mul = group->meth->field_mul;
	field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;
	p = &group->field;

	if (ctx == NULL) {
		ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
		if (ctx == NULL)
			return 0;
	}
	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	if ((n0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if ((n1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if ((n2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if ((n3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;

	/*
	 * Note that in this function we must not read components of 'a' once
	 * we have written the corresponding components of 'r'. ('r' might
	 * the same as 'a'.)
	 */

	/* n1 */
	if (a->Z_is_one) {
		if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, &group->a, p))
			goto err;
		/* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve */
	} else if (group->a_is_minus3) {
		if (!field_sqr(group, n1, &a->Z, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, &a->X, n1, p))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_sub_quick(n2, &a->X, n1, p))
			goto err;
		if (!field_mul(group, n1, n0, n2, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n0, n1, p))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p))
			goto err;
		/*
		 * n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2) = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 *
		 * Z_a^4
		 */
	} else {
		if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(n1, n0, p))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n0, n0, n1, p))
			goto err;
		if (!field_sqr(group, n1, &a->Z, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!field_sqr(group, n1, n1, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!field_mul(group, n1, n1, &group->a, ctx))
			goto err;
		if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n1, n0, p))
			goto err;
		/* n1 = 3 * X_a^2 + a_curve * Z_a^4 */
	}

	/* Z_r */
	if (a->Z_is_one) {
		if (!BN_copy(n0, &a->Y))
			goto err;
	} else {
		if (!field_mul(group, n0, &a->Y, &a->Z, ctx))
			goto err;
	}
	if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(&r->Z, n0, p))
		goto err;
	r->Z_is_one = 0;
	/* Z_r = 2 * Y_a * Z_a */

	/* n2 */
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:Heratom,项目名称:Firefly-project,代码行数:101,代码来源:ecp_smpl.c


示例5: eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange

static struct wpabuf *
eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
				struct eap_method_ret *ret,
				const struct wpabuf *reqData,
				const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
	struct wpabuf *resp = NULL;
	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
	u16 offset;
	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;

	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	    ((data->my_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	    ((mask = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): scalar allocation fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(data->grp->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd (peer): unable to get cofactor "
			   "for curve");
		goto fin;
	}

	BN_rand_range(data->private_value, data->grp->order);
	BN_rand_range(mask, data->grp->order);
	BN_add(data->my_scalar, data->private_value, mask);
	BN_mod(data->my_scalar, data->my_scalar, data->grp->order,
	       data->bnctx);

	if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, data->my_element, NULL,
			  data->grp->pwe, mask, data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): element allocation "
			   "fail");
		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
		goto fin;
	}

	if (!EC_POINT_invert(data->grp->group, data->my_element, data->bnctx))
	{
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): element inversion fail");
		goto fin;
	}
	BN_free(mask);

	if (((x = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	    ((y = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): point allocation fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/* process the request */
	if (((data->server_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	    ((K = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
	    ((point = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
	    ((data->server_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL))
	{
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): peer data allocation "
			   "fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/* element, x then y, followed by scalar */
	ptr = (u8 *) payload;
	BN_bin2bn(ptr, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime), x);
	ptr += BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
	BN_bin2bn(ptr, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime), y);
	ptr += BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
	BN_bin2bn(ptr, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order), data->server_scalar);
	if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(data->grp->group,
						 data->server_element, x, y,
						 data->bnctx)) {
		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): setting peer element "
			   "fail");
		goto fin;
	}

	/* check to ensure server's element is not in a small sub-group */
	if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, point, NULL,
				  data->server_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
				   "server element by order!\n");
			goto fin;
		}
		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, point)) {
			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): server element "
				   "is at infinity!\n");
			goto fin;
		}
	}

	/* compute the shared key, k */
	if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
			   data->server_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||
	    (!EC_POINT_add(data->grp->group, K, K, data->server_element,
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:09sea98,项目名称:rtl8188eu,代码行数:101,代码来源:eap_pwd.c


示例6: ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp

// Perform ECDSA key recovery (see SEC1 4.1.6) for curves over (mod p)-fields
// recid selects which key is recovered
// if check is nonzero, additional checks are performed
int ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(EC_KEY *eckey, ECDSA_SIG *ecsig, const unsigned char *msg, int msglen, int recid, int check)
{
    if (!eckey) return 0;

    int ret = 0;
    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

    BIGNUM *x = NULL;
    BIGNUM *e = NULL;
    BIGNUM *order = NULL;
    BIGNUM *sor = NULL;
    BIGNUM *eor = NULL;
    BIGNUM *field = NULL;
    EC_POINT *R = NULL;
    EC_POINT *O = NULL;
    EC_POINT *Q = NULL;
    BIGNUM *rr = NULL;
    BIGNUM *zero = NULL;
    int n = 0;
    int i = recid / 2;

    const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; }
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ret = -2; goto err; }
    x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_copy(x, order)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!BN_add(x, x, ecsig->r)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    field = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, field, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
    if (BN_cmp(x, field) >= 0) { ret=0; goto err; }
    if ((R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
    if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, recid % 2, ctx)) { ret=0; goto err; }
    if (check)
    {
        if ((O = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
        if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, O, NULL, R, order, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
        if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, O)) { ret = 0; goto err; }
    }
    if ((Q = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
    n = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
    e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_bin2bn(msg, msglen, e)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (8*msglen > n) BN_rshift(e, e, 8-(n & 7));
    zero = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_zero(zero)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!BN_mod_sub(e, zero, e, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_mod_inverse(rr, ecsig->r, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    sor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_mod_mul(sor, ecsig->s, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    eor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (!BN_mod_mul(eor, e, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, eor, R, sor, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
    if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, Q)) { ret=-2; goto err; }

    ret = 1;

err:
    if (ctx) {
        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
        BN_CTX_free(ctx);
    }
    if (R != NULL) EC_POINT_free(R);
    if (O != NULL) EC_POINT_free(O);
    if (Q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(Q);
    return ret;
}
开发者ID:blacksector,项目名称:procoin-watchonly,代码行数:73,代码来源:key.cpp


示例7: ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates

int 
ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP * group, const EC_POINT * point,
    BIGNUM * x, BIGNUM * y, BN_CTX * ctx)
{
	BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
	BIGNUM *Z, *Z_1, *Z_2, *Z_3;
	const BIGNUM *Z_;
	int ret = 0;

	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) > 0) {
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
		return 0;
	}
	if (ctx == NULL) {
		ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
		if (ctx == NULL)
			return 0;
	}
	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
	if ((Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if ((Z_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if ((Z_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;
	if ((Z_3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
		goto err;

	/* transform  (X, Y, Z)  into  (x, y) := (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */

	if (group->meth->field_decode) {
		if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, Z, &point->Z, ctx))
			goto err;
		Z_ = Z;
	} else {
		Z_ = &point->Z;
	}

	if (BN_is_one(Z_)) {
		if (group->meth->field_decode) {
			if (x != NULL) {
				if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, x, &point->X, ctx))
					goto err;
			}
			if (y != NULL) {
				if (!group->meth->field_decode(group, y, &point->Y, ctx))
					goto err;
			}
		} else {
			if (x != NULL) {
				if (!BN_copy(x, &point->X))
					goto err;
			}
			if (y != NULL) {
				if (!BN_copy(y, &point->Y))
					goto err;
			}
		}
	} else {
		if (!BN_mod_inverse(Z_1, Z_, &group->field, ctx)) {
			ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
		}
		if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) {
			/* field_sqr works on standard representation */
			if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, Z_2, Z_1, ctx))
				goto err;
		} else {
			if (!BN_mod_sqr(Z_2, Z_1, &group->field, ctx))
				goto err;
		}

		if (x != NULL) {
			/*
			 * in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out
			 * Montgomery factor in X:
			 */
			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x, &point->X, Z_2, ctx))
				goto err;
		}
		if (y != NULL) {
			if (group->meth->field_encode == 0) {
				/* field_mul works on standard representation */
				if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, ctx))
					goto err;
			} else {
				if (!BN_mod_mul(Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, &group->field, ctx))
					goto err;
			}

			/*
			 * in the Montgomery case, field_mul will cancel out
			 * Montgomery factor in Y:
			 */
			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, y, &point->Y, Z_3, ctx))
				goto err;
		}
	}

	ret = 1;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:Heratom,项目名称:Firefly-project,代码行数:101,代码来源:ecp_smpl.c


示例8: SM2_do_decrypt

int SM2_do_decrypt(const EVP_MD *kdf_md, const EVP_MD *mac_md,
	const SM2_CIPHERTEXT_VALUE *cv, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
	EC_KEY *ec_key)
{
	int ret = 0;
	const EC_GROUP *ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key);
	const BIGNUM *pri_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ec_key);
	KDF_FUNC kdf = KDF_get_x9_63(kdf_md);
	EC_POINT *point = NULL;
	BIGNUM *n = NULL;
	BIGNUM *h = NULL;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
	EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
	unsigned char buf[(OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 7)/4 + 1];
	unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	unsigned int maclen;
	int nbytes;
	size_t size;
	int i;

	OPENSSL_assert(kdf_md && mac_md && cv && ec_key);
	OPENSSL_assert(cv->ephem_point && cv->ciphertext);

	if (!ec_group || !pri_key) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!kdf) {
		goto end;
	}

	if (!out) {
		*outlen = cv->ciphertext_size;
		return 1;
	}
	if (*outlen < cv->ciphertext_size) {
		goto end;
	}

	/* init vars */
	point = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
	n = BN_new();
	h = BN_new();
	bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
	if (!point || !n || !h || !bn_ctx || !md_ctx) {
		goto end;
	}
	
	/* init ec domain parameters */
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ec_group, n, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(ec_group, h, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	nbytes = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ec_group) + 7) / 8;
	//OPENSSL_assert(nbytes == BN_num_bytes(n));

#if 0
	/* check sm2 curve and md is 256 bits */
	OPENSSL_assert(nbytes == 32);
	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_MD_size(kdf_md) == 32);
	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_MD_size(mac_md) == 32);
#endif

	/* B2: check [h]C1 != O */
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, point, NULL, cv->ephem_point, h, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(ec_group, point)) {
		goto end;
	}

	/* B3: compute ECDH [d]C1 = (x2, y2) */	
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, point, NULL, cv->ephem_point, pri_key, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!(size = EC_POINT_point2oct(ec_group, point,
		POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf, sizeof(buf), bn_ctx))) {
		goto end;
	}
	OPENSSL_assert(size == 1 + nbytes * 2);

	/* B4: compute t = KDF(x2 || y2, clen) */

	*outlen = cv->ciphertext_size; //FIXME: duplicated code
	kdf(buf + 1, size - 1, out, outlen);


	/* B5: compute M = C2 xor t */
	for (i = 0; i < cv->ciphertext_size; i++) {
		out[i] ^= cv->ciphertext[i];
	}
	*outlen = cv->ciphertext_size;

	/* B6: check Hash(x2 || M || y2) == C3 */
	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, mac_md, NULL)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buf + 1, nbytes)) {
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:Mumblebo,项目名称:GmSSL,代码行数:101,代码来源:sm2_enc.c


示例9: prime_field_tests

void prime_field_tests()
	{	
	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
	BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
	EC_GROUP *group;
	EC_GROUP *P_160 = NULL, *P_192 = NULL, *P_224 = NULL, *P_256 = NULL, *P_384 = NULL, *P_521 = NULL;
	EC_POINT *P, *Q, *R;
	BIGNUM *x, *y, *z;
	unsigned char buf[100];
	size_t i, len;
	int k;
	
#if 1 /* optional */
	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	if (!ctx) ABORT;
#endif

	p = BN_new();
	a = BN_new();
	b = BN_new();
	if (!p || !a || !b) ABORT;

	if (!BN_hex2bn(&p, "17")) ABORT;
	if (!BN_hex2bn(&a, "1")) ABORT;
	if (!BN_hex2bn(&b, "1")) ABORT;
	
	group = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GFp_mont_method()); /* applications should use EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp
	                                             * so that the library gets to choose the EC_METHOD */
	if (!group) ABORT;

	if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT;

	{
		EC_GROUP *tmp;
		tmp = EC_GROUP_new(EC_GROUP_method_of(group));
		if (!tmp) ABORT;
		if (!EC_GROUP_copy(tmp, group)) ABORT;
		EC_GROUP_free(group);
		group = tmp;
	}
	
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, p, a, b, ctx)) ABORT;

	fprintf(stdout, "Curve defined by Weierstrass equation\n     y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b  (mod 0x");
	BN_print_fp(stdout, p);
	fprintf(stdout, ")\n     a = 0x");
	BN_print_fp(stdout, a);
	fprintf(stdout, "\n     b = 0x");
	BN_print_fp(stdout, b);
	fprintf(stdout, "\n");

	P = EC_POINT_new(group);
	Q = EC_POINT_new(group);
	R = EC_POINT_new(group);
	if (!P || !Q || !R) ABORT;
	
	if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;
	if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;

	buf[0] = 0;
	if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, Q, buf, 1, ctx)) ABORT;

	if (!EC_POINT_add(group, P, P, Q, ctx)) ABORT;
	if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;

	x = BN_new();
	y = BN_new();
	z = BN_new();
	if (!x || !y || !z) ABORT;

	if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, "D")) ABORT;
	if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, 1, ctx)) ABORT;
	if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx))
		{
		if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, y, ctx)) ABORT;
		fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x");
		BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
		fprintf(stderr, ", y = 0x");
		BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
		ABORT;
		}

	fprintf(stdout, "A cyclic subgroup:\n");
	k = 100;
	do
		{
		if (k-- == 0) ABORT;

		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P))
			fprintf(stdout, "     point at infinity\n");
		else
			{
			if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT;

			fprintf(stdout, "     x = 0x");
			BN_print_fp(stdout, x);
			fprintf(stdout, ", y = 0x");
			BN_print_fp(stdout, y);
			fprintf(stdout, "\n");
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:174high,项目名称:openssl-0.9.8e_linux_porting,代码行数:101,代码来源:ectest.c


示例10: ec_GFp_mont_point_get_affine_coordinates

static int ec_GFp_mont_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
                                                    const EC_POINT *point,
                                                    BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y,
                                                    BN_CTX *ctx) {
  if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
    return 0;
  }

  BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
  if (ctx == NULL) {
    ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
    if (ctx == NULL) {
      return 0;
    }
  }

  int ret = 0;

  BN_CTX_start(ctx);

  if (BN_cmp(&point->Z, &group->one) == 0) {
    /* |point| is already affine. */
    if (x != NULL && !BN_from_montgomery(x, &point->X, &group->mont, ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }
    if (y != NULL && !BN_from_montgomery(y, &point->Y, &group->mont, ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }
  } else {
    /* transform  (X, Y, Z)  into  (x, y) := (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) */

    BIGNUM *Z_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    BIGNUM *Z_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    BIGNUM *Z_3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    if (Z_1 == NULL ||
        Z_2 == NULL ||
        Z_3 == NULL) {
      goto err;
    }

    /* The straightforward way to calculate the inverse of a Montgomery-encoded
     * value where the result is Montgomery-encoded is:
     *
     *    |BN_from_montgomery| + |BN_mod_inverse| + |BN_to_montgomery|.
     *
     * This is equivalent, but more efficient, because |BN_from_montgomery|
     * is more efficient (at least in theory) than |BN_to_montgomery|, since it
     * doesn't have to do the multiplication before the reduction. */
    if (!BN_from_montgomery(Z_1, &point->Z, &group->mont, ctx) ||
        !BN_from_montgomery(Z_1, Z_1, &group->mont, ctx) ||
        !BN_mod_inverse(Z_1, Z_1, &group->field, ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }

    if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(Z_2, Z_1, Z_1, &group->mont, ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }

    /* Instead of using |BN_from_montgomery| to convert the |x| coordinate
     * and then calling |BN_from_montgomery| again to convert the |y|
     * coordinate below, convert the common factor |Z_2| once now, saving one
     * reduction. */
    if (!BN_from_montgomery(Z_2, Z_2, &group->mont, ctx)) {
      goto err;
    }

    if (x != NULL) {
      if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(x, &point->X, Z_2, &group->mont, ctx)) {
        goto err;
      }
    }

    if (y != NULL) {
      if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(Z_3, Z_2, Z_1, &group->mont, ctx) ||
          !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(y, &point->Y, Z_3, &group->mont, ctx)) {
        goto err;
      }
    }
  }

  ret = 1;

err:
  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
  BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
  return ret;
}
开发者ID:DemiMarie,项目名称:ring,代码行数:88,代码来源:ec_montgomery.c


示例11: EC_KEY_get0_group

SM2_CIPHERTEXT_VALUE *SM2_do_encrypt(const EVP_MD *kdf_md, const EVP_MD *mac_md,
	const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EC_KEY *ec_key)
{
	int ok = 0;
	SM2_CIPHERTEXT_VALUE *cv = NULL;
	const EC_GROUP *ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key);
	const EC_POINT *pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key);
	KDF_FUNC kdf = KDF_get_x9_63(kdf_md);
	EC_POINT *point = NULL;
	BIGNUM *n = NULL;
	BIGNUM *h = NULL;
	BIGNUM *k = NULL;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
	EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
	unsigned char buf[(OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 7)/4 + 1];
	int nbytes;
	size_t len;
	int i;

	if (!ec_group || !pub_key) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!kdf) {
		goto end;
	}

	/* init ciphertext_value */
	if (!(cv = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SM2_CIPHERTEXT_VALUE)))) {
		goto end;
	}
	bzero(cv, sizeof(SM2_CIPHERTEXT_VALUE));
	cv->ephem_point = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
	cv->ciphertext = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
	cv->ciphertext_size = inlen;
	if (!cv->ephem_point || !cv->ciphertext) {
		goto end;
	}

	point = EC_POINT_new(ec_group);
	n = BN_new();
	h = BN_new();
	k = BN_new();
	bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
	if (!point || !n || !h || !k || !bn_ctx || !md_ctx) {
		goto end;
	}

	/* init ec domain parameters */
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ec_group, n, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(ec_group, h, bn_ctx)) {
		goto end;
	}
	nbytes = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ec_group) + 7) / 8;


	//OPENSSL_assert(nbytes == BN_num_bytes(n));

#if 0
	/* check sm2 curve and md is 256 bits */
	OPENSSL_assert(nbytes == 32);
	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_MD_size(kdf_md) == 32);
	OPENSSL_assert(EVP_MD_size(mac_md) == 32);
#endif

	do
	{
		/* A1: rand k in [1, n-1] */
		do {
			BN_rand_range(k, n);
		} while (BN_is_zero(k));

	
		/* A2: C1 = [k]G = (x1, y1) */
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, cv->ephem_point, k, NULL, NULL, bn_ctx)) {
			goto end;
		}
		
		/* A3: check [h]P_B != O */
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, point, NULL, pub_key, h, bn_ctx)) {
			goto end;
		}
		if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(ec_group, point)) {
			goto end;
		}

		/* A4: compute ECDH [k]P_B = (x2, y2) */
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(ec_group, point, NULL, pub_key, k, bn_ctx)) {
			goto end;
		}
		if (!(len = EC_POINT_point2oct(ec_group, point,
			POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf, sizeof(buf), bn_ctx))) {
			goto end;
		}
		OPENSSL_assert(len == nbytes * 2 + 1);
		
		/* A5: t = KDF(x2 || y2, klen) */
		kdf(buf + 1, len - 1, cv->ciphertext, &cv->ciphertext_size);
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:Mumblebo,项目名称:GmSSL,代码行数:101,代码来源:sm2_enc.c


示例12: process_peer_commit

int
process_peer_commit (pwd_session_t *sess, uint8_t *commit, BN_CTX *bnctx)
{
    uint8_t *ptr;
    BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
    EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
    int res = 1;

    if (((sess->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	((sess->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	((x = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	((y = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
	((point = EC_POINT_new(sess->group)) == NULL) ||
	((K = EC_POINT_new(sess->group)) == NULL) ||
	((sess->peer_element = EC_POINT_new(sess->group)) == NULL)) {
	DEBUG2("pwd: failed to allocate room to process peer's commit");
	goto fin;
    }

    if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(sess->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
	DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get group co-factor");
	goto fin;
    }

    /* element, x then y, followed by scalar */
    ptr = (uint8_t *)commit;
    BN_bin2bn(ptr, BN_num_bytes(sess->prime), x);
    ptr += BN_num_bytes(sess->prime);
    BN_bin2bn(ptr, BN_num_bytes(sess->prime), y);
    ptr += BN_num_bytes(sess->prime);
    BN_bin2bn(ptr, BN_num_bytes(sess->order), sess->peer_scalar);
    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(sess->group,
					     sess->peer_element, x, y,
					     bnctx)) {
	DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
	goto fin;
    }

    /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
    if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(sess->group, point, NULL,
			  sess->peer_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
	    DEBUG2("pwd: unable to multiply element by co-factor");
	    goto fin;
	}
	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(sess->group, point)) {
	    DEBUG2("pwd: peer's element is in small sub-group");
	    goto fin;
	}
    }

    /* compute the shared key, k */
    if ((!EC_POINT_mul(sess->group, K, NULL, sess->pwe,
		       sess->peer_scalar, bnctx)) ||
	(!EC_POINT_add(sess->group, K, K, sess->peer_element,
		       bnctx)) ||
	(!EC_POINT_mul(sess->group, K, NULL, K, sess->private_value,
		       bnctx))) {
	DEBUG2("pwd: unable to compute shared key, k");
	goto fin;
    }

    /* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
    if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(sess->group, K, NULL, K, cofactor,
			  NULL)) {
	    DEBUG2("pwd: unable to multiply k by co-factor");
	    goto fin;
	}
    }

    /*
     * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
     * co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
     * never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
     * sure" so let's be safe.
     */
    if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(sess->group, K)) {
	DEBUG2("pwd: k is point-at-infinity!");
	goto fin;
    }
    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(sess->group, K, sess->k,
					     NULL, bnctx)) {
	DEBUG2("pwd: unable to get shared secret from K");
	goto fin;
    }
    res = 0;

  fin:
    EC_POINT_free(K);
    EC_POINT_free(point);
    BN_free(cofactor);
    BN_free(x);
    BN_free(y);

    return res;
}
开发者ID:jcartermeru,项目名称:freeradius-server,代码行数:98,代码来源:eap_pwd.c


示例13: SM2err

SM2CiphertextValue *SM2_do_encrypt(const EVP_MD *md,
	const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EC_KEY *ec_key)
{
	SM2CiphertextValue *ret = NULL;
	SM2CiphertextValue *cv = NULL;
	const EC_GROUP *group;
	const EC_POINT *pub_key;
	KDF_FUNC kdf;
	EC_POINT *ephem_point = NULL;
	EC_POINT *share_point = NULL;
	BIGNUM *n = NULL;
	BIGNUM *h = NULL;
	BIGNUM *k = NULL;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
	EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;

	unsigned char buf[(OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 7)/4 + 1];
	int nbytes;
	size_t len;
	size_t i;
	unsigned int hashlen;

	/* check arguments */
	if (!md || !in || !ec_key) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
		return 0;
	}

	if (inlen < SM2_MIN_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH || inlen > SM2_MAX_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_PLAINTEXT_LENGTH);
		return 0;
	}

	if (!(kdf = KDF_get_x9_63(md))) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_DIGEST_ALGOR);
		return 0;
	}

	if (!(group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))
		|| !(pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key))) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_EC_KEY);
		return 0;
	}

	/* malloc */
	if (!(cv = SM2CiphertextValue_new())
		|| !(ephem_point = EC_POINT_new(group))
		|| !(share_point = EC_POINT_new(group))
		|| !(n = BN_new())
		|| !(h = BN_new())
		|| !(k = BN_new())
		|| !(bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new())
		|| !(md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto end;
	}

	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cv->ciphertext, NULL, (int)inlen)
		|| !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(cv->hash, NULL, EVP_MD_size(md))) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	/* init ec domain parameters */
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, n, bn_ctx)) {
		ECerr(EC_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, EC_R_ERROR);
		goto end;
	}

	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, h, bn_ctx)) {
		ECerr(EC_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, EC_R_ERROR);
		goto end;
	}

	nbytes = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;

	/* check [h]P_B != O */
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, share_point, NULL, pub_key, h, bn_ctx)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, share_point)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_PUBLIC_KEY);
		goto end;
	}

	do
	{
		size_t size;

		/* rand k in [1, n-1] */
		do {
			BN_rand_range(k, n);
		} while (BN_is_zero(k));

		/* compute ephem_point [k]G = (x1, y1) */
		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, ephem_point, k, NULL, NULL, bn_ctx)) {
			SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
			goto end;
//.........这里部分代码省略.........
开发者ID:winstard,项目名称:GmSSL,代码行数:101,代码来源:sm2_enc.c


示例14: SM2_do_decrypt


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
	}

	/* malloc */
	point = EC_POINT_new(group);
	tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
	n = BN_new();
	h = BN_new();
	bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
	md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
	if (!point || !n || !h || !bn_ctx || !md_ctx) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto end;
	}

	/* init ec domain parameters */
	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, n, bn_ctx)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, h, bn_ctx)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	nbytes = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;

	/* get x/yCoordinates as C1 = (x1, y1) */
	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
		if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point,
			cv->xCoordinate, cv->yCoordinate, bn_ctx)) {
			SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_CIPHERTEXT);
			goto end;
		}
	} else {
		if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point,
			cv->xCoordinate, cv->yCoordinate, bn_ctx)) {
			SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_CIPHERTEXT);
			goto end;
		}
	}

	/* check [h]C1 != O */
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, NULL, point, h, bn_ctx)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, tmp_point)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_CIPHERTEXT);
		goto end;
	}

	/* compute ECDH [d]C1 = (x2, y2) */
	if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, NULL, point, pri_key, bn_ctx)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	if (!(len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point,
		POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, buf, sizeof(buf), bn_ctx))) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	/* compute t = KDF(x2 || y2, clen) */
	*outlen = cv->ciphertext->length;
	kdf(buf + 1, len - 1, out, outlen);


	/* compute M = C2 xor t */
	for (i = 0; i < cv->ciphertext->length; i++) {
		out[i] ^= cv->ciphertext->data[i];
	}

	/* check hash == Hash(x2 || M || y2) */
	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)
		|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buf + 1, nbytes)
		|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, out, *outlen)
		|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buf + 1 + nbytes, nbytes)
		|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, mac, &maclen)) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
		goto end;
	}

	if (OPENSSL_memcmp(cv->hash->data, mac, maclen) != 0) {
		SM2err(SM2_F_SM2_DO_DECRYPT, SM2_R_INVALID_CIPHERTEXT);
		goto end;
	}

	ret = 1;
end:
	EC_POINT_free(point);
	EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
	BN_free(n);
	BN_free(h);
	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
	EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
	return ret;
}
开发者ID:winstard,项目名称:GmSSL,代码行数:101,代码来源:sm2_enc.c


示例15: compute_password_element


//.........这里部分代码省略.........
		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
		eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);

		BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN, rnd);

		if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
				(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
				os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
				prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
			goto fail;

		BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);

		/*
		 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but
		 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
		 * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8
		 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now
		 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
		 */
		if (primebitlen % 8)
			BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate,
				  (8 - (primebitlen % 8)));

		if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, grp->prime) >= 0)
			continue;

		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
			    prfbuf, primebytelen);

		/*
		 * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
		 * one...
		 */
		if (BN_is_odd(rnd))
			is_odd = 1;
		else
			is_odd = 0;

		/*
		 * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
		 * don't have a point
		 */
		if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(grp->group,
							     grp->pwe,
							     x_candidate,
							     is_odd, NULL))
			continue;
		/*
		 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
		 * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
		 * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
		 * hurt just to be sure.
		 */
		if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL)) {
			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
			continue;
		}

		if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
			/* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
			if (!EC_POINT_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL, grp->pwe,
					  cofactor, NULL)) {
				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: cannot "
					   "multiply generator by order");
				continue;
			}
			if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at "
					   "infinity");
				continue;
			}
		}
		/* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
		break;
	}
	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
	grp->group_num = num;
	if (0) {
 fail:
		EC_GROUP_free(grp->group);
		grp->group = NULL;
		EC_POINT_free(grp->pwe);
		grp->pwe = NULL;
		BN_free(grp->order);
		grp->order = NULL;
		BN_free(grp->prime);
		grp->prime = NULL;
		ret = 1;
	}
	/* cleanliness and order.... */
	BN_free(cofactor);
	BN_free(x_candidate);
	BN_free(rnd);
	os_free(prfbuf);

	return ret;
}
开发者ID:Adrellias,项目名称:mana,代码行数:101,代码来源:eap_pwd_common.c


示例16: char2_field_tests


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C++ EC_POINT_mul函数代码示例发布时间:2022-05-30
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C++ EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m函数代码示例发布时间:2022-05-30
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