func TestVerifyMac(t *testing.T) {
	td := macData{
		Mac: digestInfo{
			Digest: []byte{0x18, 0x20, 0x3d, 0xff, 0x1e, 0x16, 0xf4, 0x92, 0xf2, 0xaf, 0xc8, 0x91, 0xa9, 0xba, 0xd6, 0xca, 0x9d, 0xee, 0x51, 0x93},
		},
		MacSalt:    []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8},
		Iterations: 2048,
	}

	message := []byte{11, 12, 13, 14, 15}
	password, _ := bmpString([]byte(""))

	td.Mac.Algorithm.Algorithm = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 3})
	err := verifyMac(&td, message, password)
	if _, ok := err.(NotImplementedError); !ok {
		t.Errorf("err: %v", err)
	}

	td.Mac.Algorithm.Algorithm = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 26})
	err = verifyMac(&td, message, password)
	if err != ErrIncorrectPassword {
		t.Errorf("Expected incorrect password, got err: %v", err)
	}

	password, _ = bmpString([]byte("Sesame open"))
	err = verifyMac(&td, message, password)
	if err != nil {
		t.Errorf("err: %v", err)
	}

}

func TestComputeMac(t *testing.T) {
	td := macData{
		MacSalt:    []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8},
		Iterations: 2048,
	}

	message := []byte{11, 12, 13, 14, 15}
	password, _ := bmpString([]byte("Sesame open"))

	td.Mac.Algorithm.Algorithm = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 3})
	err := computeMac(&td, message, password)
	if _, ok := err.(NotImplementedError); !ok {
		t.Errorf("err: %v", err)
	}

	td.Mac.Algorithm.Algorithm = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 26})
	err = computeMac(&td, message, password)
	if err != nil {
		t.Errorf("err: %v", err)
	}

	expectedDigest := []byte{0x18, 0x20, 0x3d, 0xff, 0x1e, 0x16, 0xf4, 0x92, 0xf2, 0xaf, 0xc8, 0x91, 0xa9, 0xba, 0xd6, 0xca, 0x9d, 0xee, 0x51, 0x93}

	if bytes.Compare(td.Mac.Digest, expectedDigest) != 0 {
		t.Errorf("Computed incorrect MAC; expected MAC to be '%d' but got '%d'", expectedDigest, td.Mac.Digest)
	}

}

func TestPbDecrypterFor(t *testing.T) {
	params, _ := asn1.Marshal(pbeParams{
		Salt:       []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8},
		Iterations: 2048,
	})
	alg := pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
		Algorithm: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 3}),
		Parameters: asn1.RawValue{
			FullBytes: params,
		},
	}

	pass, _ := bmpString([]byte("Sesame open"))

	_, err := pbDecrypterFor(alg, pass)
	if _, ok := err.(NotImplementedError); !ok {
		t.Errorf("expected not implemented error, got: %T %s", err, err)
	}

	alg.Algorithm = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 12, 1, 3})
	cbc, err := pbDecrypterFor(alg, pass)
	if err != nil {
		t.Errorf("err: %v", err)
	}

	M := []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
	expectedM := []byte{185, 73, 135, 249, 137, 1, 122, 247}
	cbc.CryptBlocks(M, M)

	if bytes.Compare(M, expectedM) != 0 {
		t.Errorf("expected M to be '%d', but found '%d", expectedM, M)
	}
}

// CreateRequest returns a DER-encoded, OCSP request for the status of cert. If
// opts is nil then sensible defaults are used.
func CreateRequest(cert, issuer *x509.Certificate, opts *RequestOptions) ([]byte, error) {
	hashFunc := opts.hash()

	// OCSP seems to be the only place where these raw hash identifiers are
	// used. I took the following from
	// http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff635603.aspx
	var hashOID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
	switch hashFunc {
	case crypto.SHA1:
		hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 26})
	case crypto.SHA256:
		hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1})
	case crypto.SHA384:
		hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2})
	case crypto.SHA512:
		hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3})
	default:
		return nil, x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
	}

	if !hashFunc.Available() {
		return nil, x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
	}
	h := opts.hash().New()

	var publicKeyInfo struct {
		Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
		PublicKey asn1.BitString
	}
	if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(issuer.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo, &publicKeyInfo); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	h.Write(publicKeyInfo.PublicKey.RightAlign())
	issuerKeyHash := h.Sum(nil)

	h.Reset()
	h.Write(issuer.RawSubject)
	issuerNameHash := h.Sum(nil)

	return asn1.Marshal(ocspRequest{
		tbsRequest{
			Version: 0,
			RequestList: []request{
				{
					Cert: certID{
						pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
							Algorithm:  hashOID,
							Parameters: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 5 /* ASN.1 NULL */},
						},
						issuerNameHash,
						issuerKeyHash,
						cert.SerialNumber,
					},
				},
			},
		},
	})
}

func BuildIdentifierCaches(mib_file []string) {
	args := []string{"-f", "identifiers", "-k", "-u"}
	for _, x := range mib_file {
		args = append(args, x)
	}
	cmd := exec.Command("smidump", args...)
	stdout := new(bytes.Buffer)
	stderr := new(bytes.Buffer)
	cmd.Stdout = stdout
	cmd.Stderr = stderr
	cmd.Run()

	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(stdout)
	for scanner.Scan() {
		cols := pat_split.Split(scanner.Text(), -1)
		if len(cols) >= 4 {
			if oid, err := parseOID(cols[3]); err == nil {
				if len(oid) > max_cache_prefix_oid_length {
					max_cache_prefix_oid_length = len(oid)
				}
				if len(oid) < min_cache_prefix_oid_length {
					min_cache_prefix_oid_length = len(oid)
				}
				key := asn1.ObjectIdentifier(oid).String()
				value := fmt.Sprintf("%s::%s", cols[0], cols[1])
				cache_prefix[key] = value
			}
		}
	}
}

func TestPbEncrypt(t *testing.T) {
	tests := [][]byte{
		[]byte("A secret!"),
		[]byte("A secret"),
	}
	expected := [][]byte{
		[]byte("\x33\x73\xf3\x9f\xda\x49\xae\xfc\xa0\x9a\xdf\x5a\x58\xa0\xea\x46"), // 7 padding bytes
		[]byte("\x33\x73\xf3\x9f\xda\x49\xae\xfc\x96\x24\x2f\x71\x7e\x32\x3f\xe7"), // 8 padding bytes
	}

	for i, c := range tests {
		td := testDecryptable{
			algorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
				Algorithm: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 12, 1, 3}), // SHA1/3TDES
				Parameters: pbeParams{
					Salt:       []byte("\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8"),
					Iterations: 4096,
				}.RawASN1(),
			},
		}
		p, _ := bmpString("sesame")

		err := pbEncrypt(&td, c, p)
		if err != nil {
			t.Errorf("error encrypting %d: %v", c, err)
		}

		if bytes.Compare(td.data, expected[i]) != 0 {
			t.Errorf("expected %d to be encrypted to %d, but found %d", c, expected[i], td.data)
		}
	}
}

func TranslateOIDFromCache(oid []int) (string, string, error) {
	if len(oid) < min_cache_prefix_oid_length {
		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("no prefix cache found which length less than %d", min_cache_prefix_oid_length)
	}
	for x := max_cache_prefix_oid_length; x >= min_cache_prefix_oid_length; x-- {
		if len(oid) < x {
			continue
		}
		prefix_oid := oid[:x]
		prefix_oid_s := asn1.ObjectIdentifier(prefix_oid).String()
		if v, ok := cache_prefix[prefix_oid_s]; ok == true {
			if suffix, err := translateSuffix(oid[x:len(oid)]); err == nil {
				return v, suffix, nil
			} else {
				fmt.Println("Error: ", oid)
				return v, "", err
			}
		}
	}
	return "", "", fmt.Errorf("didn't found oid in cache: %s", asn1.ObjectIdentifier(oid).String())
}

// addPolicies adds Certificate Policies and optional Policy Qualifiers to a
// certificate, based on the input config. Go's x509 library allows setting
// Certificate Policies easily, but does not support nested Policy Qualifiers
// under those policies. So we need to construct the ASN.1 structure ourselves.
func addPolicies(template *x509.Certificate, policies []config.CertificatePolicy) error {
	asn1PolicyList := []policyInformation{}

	for _, policy := range policies {
		pi := policyInformation{
			// The PolicyIdentifier is an OID assigned to a given issuer.
			PolicyIdentifier: asn1.ObjectIdentifier(policy.ID),
		}
		switch policy.Type {
		case "id-qt-unotice":
			pi.UserNoticePolicyQualifiers = []userNoticePolicyQualifier{
				userNoticePolicyQualifier{
					PolicyQualifierID: iDQTUserNotice,
					Qualifier: userNotice{
						ExplicitText: policy.Qualifier,
					},
				},
			}
		case "id-qt-cps":
			pi.PolicyQualifiers = []policyQualifier{
				policyQualifier{
					PolicyQualifierID: iDQTUserNotice,
					Qualifier:         policy.Qualifier,
				},
			}
			pi.PolicyQualifiers = []policyQualifier{
				policyQualifier{
					PolicyQualifierID: iDQTCertificationPracticeStatement,
					Qualifier:         policy.Qualifier,
				},
			}
		case "":
			// Empty qualifier type is fine: Include this Certificate Policy, but
			// don't include a Policy Qualifier.
		default:
			return errors.New("Invalid qualifier type in Policies " + policy.Type)
		}
		asn1PolicyList = append(asn1PolicyList, pi)
	}

	asn1Bytes, err := asn1.Marshal(asn1PolicyList)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	template.ExtraExtensions = append(template.ExtraExtensions, pkix.Extension{
		Id:       asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 5, 29, 32},
		Critical: false,
		Value:    asn1Bytes,
	})
	return nil
}

// UnmarshalJSON implements the json.Unmarshler interface
func (s *SignatureAlgorithm) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
	var aux auxSignatureAlgorithm
	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &aux); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	*s = UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
	oid := asn1.ObjectIdentifier(aux.OID.AsSlice())
	for _, val := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
		if val.oid.Equal(oid) {
			*s = val.algo
			break
		}
	}
	return nil
}

func TestPbDecrypt(t *testing.T) {

	tests := [][]byte{
		[]byte("\x33\x73\xf3\x9f\xda\x49\xae\xfc\xa0\x9a\xdf\x5a\x58\xa0\xea\x46"), // 7 padding bytes
		[]byte("\x33\x73\xf3\x9f\xda\x49\xae\xfc\x96\x24\x2f\x71\x7e\x32\x3f\xe7"), // 8 padding bytes
		[]byte("\x35\x0c\xc0\x8d\xab\xa9\x5d\x30\x7f\x9a\xec\x6a\xd8\x9b\x9c\xd9"), // 9 padding bytes, incorrect
		[]byte("\xb2\xf9\x6e\x06\x60\xae\x20\xcf\x08\xa0\x7b\xd9\x6b\x20\xef\x41"), // incorrect padding bytes: [ ... 0x04 0x02 ]
	}
	expected := []interface{}{
		[]byte("A secret!"),
		[]byte("A secret"),
		ErrDecryption,
		ErrDecryption,
	}

	for i, c := range tests {
		td := testDecryptable{
			data: c,
			algorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
				Algorithm: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 12, 1, 3}), // SHA1/3TDES
				Parameters: pbeParams{
					Salt:       []byte("\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8"),
					Iterations: 4096,
				}.RawASN1(),
			},
		}
		p, _ := bmpString([]byte("sesame"))

		m, err := pbDecrypt(td, p)

		switch e := expected[i].(type) {
		case []byte:
			if err != nil {
				t.Errorf("error decrypting C=%x: %v", c, err)
			}
			if bytes.Compare(m, e) != 0 {
				t.Errorf("expected C=%x to be decoded to M=%x, but found %x", c, e, m)
			}
		case error:
			if err == nil || err.Error() != e.Error() {
				t.Errorf("expecting error '%v' during decryption of c=%x, but found err='%v'", e, c, err)
			}
		}
	}
}

func TestPbDecrypterFor(t *testing.T) {
	params, _ := asn1.Marshal(pbeParams{
		Salt:       []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8},
		Iterations: 2048,
	})
	alg := pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
		Algorithm: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 3}),
		Parameters: asn1.RawValue{
			FullBytes: params,
		},
	}

	pass, _ := bmpString("Sesame open")

	_, _, err := pbDecrypterFor(alg, pass)
	if _, ok := err.(NotImplementedError); !ok {
		t.Errorf("expected not implemented error, got: %T %s", err, err)
	}

	alg.Algorithm = sha1WithTripleDES
	cbc, blockSize, err := pbDecrypterFor(alg, pass)
	if err != nil {
		t.Errorf("unexpected error from pbDecrypterFor %v", err)
	}
	if blockSize != 8 {
		t.Errorf("unexpected block size %d, wanted 8", blockSize)
	}

	plaintext := []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
	expectedCiphertext := []byte{185, 73, 135, 249, 137, 1, 122, 247}
	ciphertext := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
	cbc.CryptBlocks(ciphertext, plaintext)

	if bytes.Compare(ciphertext, expectedCiphertext) != 0 {
		t.Errorf("bad ciphertext, got %x but wanted %x", ciphertext, expectedCiphertext)
	}
}

)

type macData struct {
	Mac        digestInfo
	MacSalt    []byte
	Iterations int `asn1:"optional,default:1"`
}

// from PKCS#7:
type digestInfo struct {
	Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
	Digest    []byte
}

var (
	oidSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 26})
)

func verifyMac(macData *macData, message, password []byte) error {
	if !macData.Mac.Algorithm.Algorithm.Equal(oidSHA1) {
		return NotImplementedError("unknown digest algorithm: " + macData.Mac.Algorithm.Algorithm.String())
	}

	key := pbkdf(sha1Sum, 20, 64, macData.MacSalt, password, macData.Iterations, 3, 20)

	mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, key)
	mac.Write(message)
	expectedMAC := mac.Sum(nil)

	if !hmac.Equal(macData.Mac.Digest, expectedMAC) {
		return ErrIncorrectPassword

// Sign signs a new certificate based on the PEM-encoded client
// certificate or certificate request with the signing profile,
// specified by profileName.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req signer.SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error) {
	profile, err := signer.Profile(s, req.Profile)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(req.Request))
	if block == nil {
		return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
	}

	if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
		return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError,
			cferr.BadRequest, errors.New("not a certificate or csr"))
	}

	csrTemplate, err := signer.ParseCertificateRequest(s, block.Bytes)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	// Copy out only the fields from the CSR authorized by policy.
	safeTemplate := x509.Certificate{}
	// If the profile contains no explicit whitelist, assume that all fields
	// should be copied from the CSR.
	if profile.CSRWhitelist == nil {
		safeTemplate = *csrTemplate
	} else {
		if profile.CSRWhitelist.Subject {
			safeTemplate.Subject = csrTemplate.Subject
		}
		if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
			safeTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm = csrTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm
		}
		if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKey {
			safeTemplate.PublicKey = csrTemplate.PublicKey
		}
		if profile.CSRWhitelist.SignatureAlgorithm {
			safeTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm
		}
		if profile.CSRWhitelist.DNSNames {
			safeTemplate.DNSNames = csrTemplate.DNSNames
		}
		if profile.CSRWhitelist.IPAddresses {
			safeTemplate.IPAddresses = csrTemplate.IPAddresses
		}
	}

	OverrideHosts(&safeTemplate, req.Hosts)
	safeTemplate.Subject = PopulateSubjectFromCSR(req.Subject, safeTemplate.Subject)

	// If there is a whitelist, ensure that both the Common Name and SAN DNSNames match
	if profile.NameWhitelist != nil {
		if safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName != "" {
			if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName)) == nil {
				return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
			}
		}
		for _, name := range safeTemplate.DNSNames {
			if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(name)) == nil {
				return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
			}
		}
	}

	if profile.ClientProvidesSerialNumbers {
		if req.Serial == nil {
			fmt.Printf("xx %#v\n", profile)
			return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.MissingSerial)
		}
		safeTemplate.SerialNumber = req.Serial
	} else {
		// RFC 5280 4.1.2.2:
		// Certificate users MUST be able to handle serialNumber
		// values up to 20 octets.  Conforming CAs MUST NOT use
		// serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.
		//
		// If CFSSL is providing the serial numbers, it makes
		// sense to use the max supported size.
		serialNumber := make([]byte, 20)
		_, err = io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, serialNumber)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.Unknown, err)
		}

		// SetBytes interprets buf as the bytes of a big-endian
		// unsigned integer. The leading byte should be masked
		// off to ensure it isn't negative.
		serialNumber[0] &= 0x7F

		safeTemplate.SerialNumber = new(big.Int).SetBytes(serialNumber)
	}

	if len(req.Extensions) > 0 {
		for _, ext := range req.Extensions {
			oid := asn1.ObjectIdentifier(ext.ID)
			if !profile.ExtensionWhitelist[oid.String()] {
//.........这里部分代码省略.........

	"crypto"
	"crypto/ecdsa"
	"crypto/elliptic"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/sha1"
	"crypto/x509"
	"crypto/x509/pkix"
	"encoding/asn1"
	"errors"
	"math/big"
	"strconv"
	"time"
)

var idPKIXOCSPBasic = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1, 1})

// ResponseStatus contains the result of an OCSP request. See
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6960#section-2.3
type ResponseStatus int

const (
	Success       ResponseStatus = 0
	Malformed     ResponseStatus = 1
	InternalError ResponseStatus = 2
	TryLater      ResponseStatus = 3
	// Status code four is unused in OCSP. See
	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6960#section-4.2.1
	SignatureRequired ResponseStatus = 5
	Unauthorized      ResponseStatus = 6
)

// MarshalJSON marshals an oid into a JSON string.
func (oid OID) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
	return []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`"%v"`, asn1.ObjectIdentifier(oid))), nil
}

func (bin *Binary) RemoveAppendedTag() (contents []byte, err error) {
	if _, ok := bin.AppendedTag(); !ok {
		return nil, errors.New("authenticodetag: no appended tag found")
	}

	return bin.buildBinary(bin.asn1Data, nil), nil
}

func (bin *Binary) SetAppendedTag(tagContents []byte) (contents []byte, err error) {
	return bin.buildBinary(bin.asn1Data, tagContents), nil
}

// oidChromeTag is an OID that we use for the extension in the superfluous
// certificate. It's in the Google arc, but not officially assigned.
var oidChromeTag = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 1, 9999})

func (bin *Binary) getSuperfluousCert() (cert *x509.Certificate, err error) {
	n := len(bin.signedData.PKCS7.Certs)
	if n == 0 {
		return nil, nil
	}

	if cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(bin.signedData.PKCS7.Certs[n-1].FullBytes); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	for _, ext := range cert.Extensions {
		if !ext.Critical && ext.Id.Equal(oidChromeTag) {
			return cert, nil
		}

//.........这里部分代码省略.........

		if !p.NotBefore.IsZero() && !p.NotAfter.IsZero() && p.NotAfter.Before(p.NotBefore) {
			return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, err)
		}

		if len(p.Policies) > 0 {
			for _, policy := range p.Policies {
				for _, qualifier := range policy.Qualifiers {
					if qualifier.Type != "" && qualifier.Type != "id-qt-unotice" && qualifier.Type != "id-qt-cps" {
						return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
							errors.New("invalid policy qualifier type"))
					}
				}
			}
		}
	} else if p.RemoteName != "" {
		log.Debug("match remote in profile to remotes section")
		if p.AuthRemote.RemoteName != "" {
			log.Error("profile has both a remote and an auth remote specified")
			return cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
		}
		if remote := cfg.Remotes[p.RemoteName]; remote != "" {
			if err := p.updateRemote(remote); err != nil {
				return err
			}
		} else {
			return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
				errors.New("failed to find remote in remotes section"))
		}
	} else {
		log.Debug("match auth remote in profile to remotes section")
		if remote := cfg.Remotes[p.AuthRemote.RemoteName]; remote != "" {
			if err := p.updateRemote(remote); err != nil {
				return err
			}
		} else {
			return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
				errors.New("failed to find remote in remotes section"))
		}
	}

	if p.AuthKeyName != "" {
		log.Debug("match auth key in profile to auth_keys section")
		if key, ok := cfg.AuthKeys[p.AuthKeyName]; ok == true {
			if key.Type == "standard" {
				p.Provider, err = auth.New(key.Key, nil)
				if err != nil {
					log.Debugf("failed to create new standard auth provider: %v", err)
					return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
						errors.New("failed to create new standard auth provider"))
				}
			} else {
				log.Debugf("unknown authentication type %v", key.Type)
				return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
					errors.New("unknown authentication type"))
			}
		} else {
			return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
				errors.New("failed to find auth_key in auth_keys section"))
		}
	}

	if p.AuthRemote.AuthKeyName != "" {
		log.Debug("match auth remote key in profile to auth_keys section")
		if key, ok := cfg.AuthKeys[p.AuthRemote.AuthKeyName]; ok == true {
			if key.Type == "standard" {
				p.RemoteProvider, err = auth.New(key.Key, nil)
				if err != nil {
					log.Debugf("failed to create new standard auth provider: %v", err)
					return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
						errors.New("failed to create new standard auth provider"))
				}
			} else {
				log.Debugf("unknown authentication type %v", key.Type)
				return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
					errors.New("unknown authentication type"))
			}
		} else {
			return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
				errors.New("failed to find auth_remote's auth_key in auth_keys section"))
		}
	}

	if p.NameWhitelistString != "" {
		log.Debug("compiling whitelist regular expression")
		rule, err := regexp.Compile(p.NameWhitelistString)
		if err != nil {
			return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
				errors.New("failed to compile name whitelist section"))
		}
		p.NameWhitelist = rule
	}

	p.ExtensionWhitelist = map[string]bool{}
	for _, oid := range p.AllowedExtensions {
		p.ExtensionWhitelist[asn1.ObjectIdentifier(oid).String()] = true
	}

	return nil
}

// Package ocsp parses OCSP responses as specified in RFC 2560. OCSP responses
// are signed messages attesting to the validity of a certificate for a small
// period of time. This is used to manage revocation for X.509 certificates.
package ocsp

import (
	"crypto"
	"crypto/rsa"
	_ "crypto/sha1"
	"crypto/x509"
	"crypto/x509/pkix"
	"encoding/asn1"
	"time"
)

var idPKIXOCSPBasic = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1, 1})
var idSHA1WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 5})

// These are internal structures that reflect the ASN.1 structure of an OCSP
// response. See RFC 2560, section 4.2.

const (
	ocspSuccess       = 0
	ocspMalformed     = 1
	ocspInternalError = 2
	ocspTryLater      = 3
	ocspSigRequired   = 4
	ocspUnauthorized  = 5
)

type certID struct {

package pkcs12

import (
	"bytes"
	"crypto/cipher"
	"crypto/des"
	"crypto/x509/pkix"
	"encoding/asn1"
	"errors"

	"github.com/joonakannisto/gocrypto/pkcs12/internal/rc2"
)

var (
	oidPBEWithSHAAnd3KeyTripleDESCBC = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 12, 1, 3})
	oidPBEWithSHAAnd40BitRC2CBC      = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 12, 1, 6})
)

// pbeCipher is an abstraction of a PKCS#12 cipher.
type pbeCipher interface {
	// create returns a cipher.Block given a key.
	create(key []byte) (cipher.Block, error)
	// deriveKey returns a key derived from the given password and salt.
	deriveKey(salt, password []byte, iterations int) []byte
	// deriveKey returns an IV derived from the given password and salt.
	deriveIV(salt, password []byte, iterations int) []byte
}

type shaWithTripleDESCBC struct{}

 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

package pkcs7

import (
	"crypto/x509"
	"encoding/asn1"
	"fmt"
)

var signedDataIdentifier = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7, 2})

// SignedDataEnvelope represents a wrapped SignedData
// object found in PEM-encoded PKCS7 blocks.
type SignedDataEnvelope struct {
	Raw        asn1.RawContent
	Type       asn1.ObjectIdentifier
	SignedData SignedData `asn1:"tag:0,explicit,optional"`
}

// SignedData contains signed data and related info.
// Refer to RFC 2315, Section 9.1 for definition of this type.
type SignedData struct {
	Version          int
	DigestAlgorithms []asn1.ObjectIdentifier `asn1:"set"`
	ContentInfo      asn1.RawValue